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Recent Cases
FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN MISSOURI-
HISTORY AND APPRAISAL
State ex tel. Chicago, R.L & Pac. Ry. v. Riederer1
On May 29, 1969, Scantlin brought an action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act2 against the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail-
road in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. He sought damages
of $100,000 for alleged injuries received in Liberal, Kansas on July 29, 1966,
while employed as a switchman by defendant. The railroad filed a verified
motion to dismiss the suit under the doctrine of forum non convenienss on
the grounds that all witnesses to the accident were located in Liberal, Kan-
sas, over 400 miles from Kansas City, and that the necessary medical wit-
nesses were located in either Liberal or Hayes, Kansas, 260 miles from
Kansas City. Defendant argued it would be subjected to considerable and
unnecessary expense if the action were allowed to proceed in Missouri
courts, and offered to waive any right to rely on any statute of limitations
in a subsequent action by Scantlin if the action were dismissed in Missouri
upon its motion.4 Scantlin opposed the motion to dismiss averring: (1) that
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not available in Missouri for
F.E.L.A. actions, and (2) that even if the doctrine were available it could
not be properly applied to the instant facts. The trial judge, relying on
State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfields ruled that he did not have the dis-
cretionary right to entertain a motion based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens when the action was brought under the F.E.L.A.
Defendant then brought this proceeding for mandamus in the Supreme
Court of Missouri to compel the trial judge to exercise his discretion in de-
termining the motion to dismiss on its merits under the doctrine of forum
1. 454 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
2. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et. seq. (1954).
3. REsrATEmNT (SECOND) OF CoNFuCr oF LAws § 84 (Proposed Official
Draft, Part I, 1967) states the doctrine of forum non conveniens as follows:
A state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum
for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is avail-
able to the plaintiff.
4. Before forum non conveniens can apply there must be another forum
available to the plaintiff for the bringing of the action. Under 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1954),
F.E.LA. actions must be "commenced within three years from the day the cause of
action accrued. . ." Many courts will accept a waiver by the defendant of their
rights to rely on any statute of limitations when considering a motion to dismiss.
E.g., Semanishin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 46 N.J. 531, 218 A.2d 401 (1966);
Vargas v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39 (1957), aff'd,
25 N.J. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958) (voluntary sub-
mission to jurisdiction and the paying of plaintiff's attorney fees acceptable as
precondition to dismissal). Cf. Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165,
89 N.W.2d 654 (1958).
5. 362 Mo. 101, 240 S.W.2d 106 (En Banc 1951).
(105)
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non conveniens. The court, sitting en banc, held that the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is available in transitory F.E.L.A. suits brought in Missouri.
Mayfield was overruled insofar as it conflicted with this holding. A
peremptory writ of mandamus was issued.
The historical origin of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is open
to some debate. It has been suggested that the doctrine is rooted in the
common law.6 On the other hand, some courts have suggested that the
doctrine was "created" by a law review writer in the late 1920's.7 Whatever
the origin of the doctrine, it is now firmly established in American juris-
prudence, having been at least nominally accepted in many state jurisdic-
tions8 and by the federal courts.9 As Riederer indicates, the doctrine has
6. Gonzales v. Atchison, T.& S.F.Ry., 189 Kan. 689, 871 P.2d 193 (1962)(adopting the doctrine from common law); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLTm. L. Rv. 1 (1929); Barrett, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAr. L. REv. 380 (1947). On the doctrine
generally see 20 Am. Jua.21 Courts §§ 172-82 (1965); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 1022(1945), supp. 43 A.L.R.2d 774 (1955) (F.E.L.A. suits); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 6 (1924),
supp. 48 A.L.R.2d 800 (1956) (non-statutory tort actions); Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d
1109 (1963) (contract actions); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 545 (1966) (matrimonial dis-
putes).
7. State ex. rel. Great N.Ry. v. District Court, 189 Mont. 458, 460, 365 P.2d
512, 517 (1961) (concurring opinion); Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54
Wash.2d 124, 127, 338 P.2d 747, 749 (1959); both opinions suggest the doctrine was
"created" by Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 COLUMf. L. REv. 1 (1929).
8. The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been specifically adopted and
used in sixteen jurisdictions: California: Price v. Atchison, T. 8 S.F. Ry., 42 Cal.2d
577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 839 (1954); Delaware: Winsor v.
United Airlines, Inc., 52 Del. 161, 154 A.2d 561 (DeL Super. 1958); District of
Columbia: Walsh v. Crescent Hill Co., 134 A.2d 658 (D.C. Mun. App. 1957);
Florida: Southern Ry. v. McCubbins, 196 So.2d 512 (Fla. App. 1967); Illinois:
Whitney v. Madden 400 I1. 185, 79 N.E.2d 593 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 828(1948); Maine: Foss v. Richards, 126 Me. 419, 139 A. 313 (1927) (does not use
terminology: forum non conveniens); Massachusetts: Universal Adjustment Corp.
v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 308, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); Minnesota: Johnson v. Chi-
cago, B. & Q.R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 768 (1954); Mississippi: Strickland v.
Humble Oil &c Refining Co., 194 Miss. 194, 11 So.2d 820 (1943); Missouri: Elliott
v. Johnston, 865 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589 (1956); New Hampshire: Jackson & Sons
v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N.H. 841, 168 A. 895 (1933) (does not use
terminology: forum non conveniens but terminology is used in Vandam v. Smit,
101 N.H. 503, 148 A.2d 289 (1959)); New Jersey: Gore v. United State Steel Corp.,
15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954); New York: e.g., Taylor v. Interstate Motor Freight
System, 285 App. Div. 1010, 139 N.Y.Supp.2d 130 (1955). Oklahoma: St. Louis-S.F.
Ry. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773 (Okla. 1954) (accepting doctrine) and 290
P.2d 118 (Okla. 1955) (same case, application of doctrine approved); Pennsylvania:
Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 399 Pa. 533, 160 A.2d 549 (1960); Texas: e.g., Focum-Dean
Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 841 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), but see Allen v.
Bass, 47 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
In six jurisdictions the doctrine has been accepted but no case has arisen on ap-
peal where the doctrine was applied resulting in the dismissal of the action: Arkan-
sas: Running v. Southwest Freight Lines, 227 Ark. 839, 303 S.W.2d 578 (1957);
Kansas: Gonzales v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 189 Kan. 689, 371 P.2d 193 (1962);
Louisiana: Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 784 (1920) (not using "forum
non conveniens" terminology), but see Trahan v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 200 So.2d 118(La. App. 1967), cert. denied, 251 La. 47, 202 So.2d 657 (1967). (The court states:
"The doctrine of 'forum non conveniens' is foreign to our jurisprudence." 200
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been accepted in Missouri. The terminology "forum non conveniens" was
first used by Missouri courts in State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield,O
the First Mayfield Case. The case consolidated two proceedings in man-
damus seeking to compel trial courts to entertain motions for dismissal
under the doctrine. Both actions were brought by non-residents in the Cir-
cuit Court of St. Louis under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Both
defendant railroads were foreign corporations maintaining agents in St.
Louis. Both accidents occurred outside of Missouri, one 650 and the other
700 miles from St. Louis. The court refused to issue mandatory writs, ap-
So. 2d at 122. However, the court was refusing to apply doctrine to change venue
within the state); Tennessee: Zurick v. Inman, 221 Tenn. 393, 426 S.W.2d 767(1968); Utah: Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950)
(accepting the doctrine) and 123 Utah 229, 257 P.2d 947 (1953) (same case, approv-
ing the doctrine's application); Wisconsin: Lau v. Chicago 8& N.W. Ry., 14 Wis.2d
329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961). In addition, one jurisdiction has possibly adopted the
doctrine but the opinion leaves some doubt. Montana: State ex. rel. Great N. ly.
v. District Court, 139 Mont. 453, 365 P.2d 512 (1961).
In five jurisdictions the courts have used language indicating the doctrine of
torum non conveniens might receive approval were the issue to be raised: Georgia:
Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. Mente & Co., 173 Ga. 1, 159 S.E. 497 (1931);
Atlantic Coast Line RR. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, 71 S.E.2d 243 (1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 345 U.S. 379 (1952); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pope, 93 Ga. App.
550, 92 S.E.2d 300 (1956); Indiana: Hartunian v. Wolflick, 125 Ind. App. 98 122
N.E.2d 622 (1954); Kentucky: Kirkland v. Greer, 295 Ky. 535, 174 S.W.2d 745(1943); Oregon: Homer v. Pleasant Creek Mining Corp., 165 Ore. 683, 107 P.2d
989 (1940); Vermont: Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80
A.2d 664 (1951).
In two jurisdictions the doctrine has been rejected by name: Alabama: State
ex. rel. Southern Ky., 254 Ala. 10, 47 So.2d 249 (1950); and Washington: Lansverk
v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash.2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959). In four otherjurisdictions there are cases which would seem to preclude application of the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens but these cases might be vulnerable to challenge.
Iowa: Bradbury v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 149 Iowa 51, 128 N.W. 1 (1910) error
dismissed 223 U.S. 711 (1911); Michigan: Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44
N.W. 623 (1890); Nebraska: Herrmann v. Franklin Ice Cream Co., 114 Neb. 468,
208 N.W. 141 (1926); and Ohio: Mattone v. Argentina, 123 Ohio St. 393, 175
N.E. 603 (1931); but cf. Fellers v. Belau, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 54, 178 N.E.2d 530 (Ct. C.P.
1961).
9. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. American Lumber-
men's Mut., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). Shortly after these decisions were delivered
Congress enacted the Judicial Code of 1948 creating 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a), which pro-
vides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a dis-
trict court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1962). This statute was basically
an attempt to codify the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Revisor's Note to
1404 (a) states: "Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens...." 1 J. MooRE, FEDmRau. PRAcrncE § 0.145[1]n.1 (2d ed. 1964).
Of course the provisions of § 1404 (a) are distinguishable from the judicial doctrine
since a determination that a case would be better tried elsewhere leads to a transfer,
not a dismissal. The non-statutory doctrine is not dead at the federal level, see Alt-
man v. Central of Ga. Ky., 254 F.Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1965) (dismissing on grounds
of forum non conveniens when there was no other federal court where "the action
might have been brought"). However, the non-statutory doctrine is infrequently
used in federal courts, since it was held that a transfer under § 1404 (a) requires a
lesser showing of inconvenience than traditional forum non conveniens dismissal.
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
10. 359 Mo. 827, 224 S.W.2d 105 (En Banc 1949).
1971]
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parently basing their decision on two grounds. First, the court held that
the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Kepner"3 and Miles v. Illinois C.R.R.12 barred state courts from using the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss F.E.L.A. actions.' s Second, the
court held that even if Kepner and Miles were not controlling, Missouri
could not apply the doctrine because the state policy was to allow all Mis-
souri citizens, resident or non-resident, to maintain F.E.L.A. actions in Mis-
souri courts; to deny non-citizens this right would violate the "privileges and
immunities clause" of the United States Constitution.14
The defendant railroads were granted certiorari and carried the case
to the Supreme Court in Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield.15 Mr.
justice Frankfurter, delivering the opinion of the Court, said Kepner and
Miles did not compel a state court to accept F.E.L.A. actions "... if in sim-
ilar cases the State for reason of local policy denies resort to its court and
enforces its policy impartially . . . so as not to involve discrimination
against . .." F.E.L.A. suits.'l The Court went on to point out that the
"privileges and immunities dause" did bar discrimination between suits
on the basis of citizenship; however, state courts could properly refuse to
entertain suits on the basis of residency of the parties.' 7
Upon remand the Missouri Supreme Court again addressed the issue
of forum non conveniens in State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield,'8 the
so-called Second Mayfield Case. With the supposed compulsion of Kepner
and Miles removed, the court again rejected the doctrine, this time using
broader language indicating that the doctrine was not available to dismiss
any transitory cause of action. Again, the opinion hinged on the "privileges
and immunities clause." The court stated:
The policy of this state has been to bar none of its citizens from
its courts where there is proper venue and jurisdiction of the parties
and subject matter, and this applies to citizens who are residents
as well as non-residents. 9
11. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
12. 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
13. Both Kepner and Miles, in holding that state courts could not enjoin
F.E.L.A. actions brought by their citizens in another state's courts, used language
that strongly suggested that F.E.L.A.'s special venue provisions (45 U.S.C. § 56
(1954); 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (a) (1962)) rendered that type of action free from attack on
grounds of forum non conveniens.
14. U.S. CONsT. art IV, § 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.. .
15. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
16. Id. at 4. The court stated that Kepner and Miles were not controlling
even prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1962) (See note 9 supra), citing
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). However, Mr. Justice
Jackson in a concurring opinion stated:
Certainly a state is under no obligation to provide a court for two non-
resident parties to litigate a foreign-born cause of action when the Federal
Government, which creates the cause of action, frees its own courts within
that state from manditory consideration of the same case. Missouri ex. rel.
Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 6 (1950).
17. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. Se H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
18. 362 Mo. 101, 240 S.W.2d 106 (En Banc 1951).
19. Id. at 107, 240 S.W.2d at 108.
[Vol. 36
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This policy was said to be widely followed in Missouri case law and specif-
ically grounded in constitutional and statutory provisions. The court cited
Article I, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution20 as requiring the an-
nounced result. Section 507.020, RSMo 1949 [now Section 507.020, RSMo
1969]21 was said to have been a legislative declaration of comity, and, having
been held mandatory in State ex rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm,2 2
it likewise required that the doctrine of forum non conveniens be rejected in
Missouri.
In the Second Mayfield Case, the court's assessment of the posture of
Missouri case law was doubtlessly correct. In several prior cases28 the
state's courts had been asked to decline jurisdiction over transitory actions.
Those cases had to contend with reasoning more than faintly similar to the
parlance common to the doctrine of forum non conveniens today. In all in-
stances the court felt compelled not to dismiss. These cases were all decided,
however, before the doctrine of forum non conveniens started to bloom in
this country. Taken at face value and considering the apparent unequivocal
stance the court chose to adopt, it appeared the Mayfield Cases laid to rest
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Missouri. Today, however, it is
clear that the decisions were vulnerable. The court, by discussing the doc-
trine essentially in terms of principles and precedents, had failed to come to
grips with the true policy issues involved, i.e., the value of doctrine as a
tool of judicial management.
In 1952 a change in attitude concerning the doctrine of forum non
conveniens started to become apparent in Missouri. In that year the
Missouri Supreme Court published the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 18.03 of those proposed rules sought to adopt the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. Section 18.08 led to heated debate among Missouri attor-
neys. The section was opposed by a faction led by the Kansas City and
St. Louis bars.24 It was argued that the rule would force Missouri residents
20. Mo. CONsT. art I, § 14: "That the courts of justice shall be open to every
person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or char-
acter, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or de-
lay."
21. § 507.020, RSMo 1969: "Whenever a claim exists under the law of another
state, action thereon may be brought in this state by (1) The person or persons
entitled to the proceeds of such claim if he or they are authorized to bring such
action by the laws of said other state ..... "
22. 239 Mo. 135, 143 S.W. 483 (En Banc 1911).
23. Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S.W.2d 684 (1929) ("inconvenience"
to defendant no bar in F.E.L.A. action); Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co., 267 Mo. 524, 184 S.W. 999 (En Banc 1916) (suit by Ariz. corp. against
Pa. corp. on insurance policy issued out of state for damages incurred in Colo.
held properly entertained in state); State ex. rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S.W. 483 (En Banc 1911) (transitory suit on insurance
policy not dismissable because (1) defendant claims possible difficulty in compelling
appearance of out-of-state witnesses, (2) expense, (3) harassment; 7 other cases de-
cided per curiam to same effect on same day); Lessenden v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 238Mo. 247, 142 S.W. 332 (En Banc 1911) (no fraud upon the law"); Newlin v. St.
Louis, S.F. Ry., 222 Mo. 375, 121 S.W. 125 (1909).24. Report of the Committee of the Kansas City Bar Association on Proposed
Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 J. Mo. B. 1 (1953); Brief of Kansas City Bar Ass'nto Mo. Sup. Ct. on Proposed Rules (1953); Brief of Lawer Ass'n of St. Louis to
1971]
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to litigate actions arising outside the state in foreign courts, and took no
cognizance of statutes of limitation. F.E.L.A. actions were mentioned as
a point of specific concern. 25 This, it was argued, was unfair and uncon-
stitutional and "would drastically affect the earnings of Missouri attorneys
and prevent them from handling [as] many cases arising outside Missouri
as now."26 Other factions of the state bar supported Section 18.03.27 In
reply to the criticism it was said:
[T]he fear that legal business will be dragged from the state has
been expressed. Not only are these protestants expressing an im-
proper motive, but they are probably wrong in gauging the effect
of the change. If the volume of out-of-town cases, for which special
consideration is always sought, is reduced, then local cases can be
tried more expeditiously and lawyers can dispose of their business
and can realize their fee sooner.28
Rule 18.03 was never adopted. It seems, however, to have signaled the
fact that the doctrine of forum non conveniens might still possess vitality
in this state. It also focused the controversy on the doctrine's practical
aspects. 29
Mo. Sup. Ct. on Proposed Rules (1953); see also Brief for Respondant as Amicus
Curiae at 1, Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. 1958) (K.C. Bar Ass'n as amicus
curiae).
25. Report of the Committee of the Kansas City Bar Association on Proposed
Rules of Civil Procedure, 9 J. Mo. B. 1, 2 (1953).
26. Id. at 6.
27. Blackmar, Missouri's Proposed Civil Rules - A Critical Synopsis, 21
U.K.C.L. REv. 57, 70 (1952); Schwarz, Forum Non Conveniens Provision, 9 J. Mo.
B. 41, 43 (1953).
28. Blackmar, supra, note 27 at 70, 71.
29. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in depth the question of
which practical considerations have influenced the courts of this country in their
adoption of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Preliminary research, however,
indicates the courts have consciously or unconsciously sought to limit "forum shop-
ping" and perhaps control what they consider undersirable practices by certain
members of the bar.
(1) Forum shopping:
"On occasion, a plaintiff will bring suit... [in a foreign jurisdiction] in
the belief that he may there secure a larger or an easier recovery or in the
hope that the inconvenience and burden of making a defense will induce
the defendant to enter a compromise, to contest the case less strenuously,
or to permit judgment to be entered against him by default."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAws § 84, comment a at 310, 311 (Pro-
posed Official Draft, Part I, 1967). Numerous cases allude to the burden foreign
transitory suits place on their already crowded dockets. The proposition that "forum
shoppers" seek out large urban areas in search of tactical advantages seems to be
born out by the fact that while 45% of the all state jurisdictions in this country
accept the doctrine, the doctrine has been accepted in 55% of those jurisdictions
containing the top 50 cities by population (with another 14% favorably disposed
towards the doctrine). In those jurisdictions containing none of the top 50 cities
the doctrine has only been accepted at a rate of 33%, with another 4 % favorably
disposed. Of the leading 15 states by population, 10 accept the doctrine and an-
other is favorably disposed toward it.
(2) Undesirable Practice: Justice Doyle in State ex. rel. Great N. Ry. v. District
Court, 189 Mont. 453, 474-7, 365 P.2d 512, 523-4 (1961) (especially concurring
[Vol. 36
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In 1956, five years after the Second Mayfield Case, the court adopted
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Missouri in Elliott v. Johnston.30
The facts of the case were somewhat bizarre. All parties were Kansas resi-
dents involved in an automobile accident in Kansas. Plaintiff's attorney,
apparently without the permission of his clients, arranged with the de-
fendant, without the knowledge of his insurer, to bring the suit in Nevada,
Missouri.31 On defendant's insurer's motion to "quash service," the trial
court "of its own motion" dismissed the action because the parties' fraud-
ulent "and collusive conduct" constituted "a legal fraud upon the court
and taxpayers of Vernon County."3 2 The Missouri Supreme Court, using
the terminology "forum non conveniens" for the first time in the pro-
ceedings, held that while this might not have been a case of fraud, the trial
court did have an inherent discretionary power to decline jurisdiction and
the power was properly applied here.
Elliott uses language almost diametrically opposed to that quoted above
from the Second Mayfield Case, stating that the plaintiff's "right is not one
of the absolutes of the law so as to compel retention of jurisdiction and
opinion) gives an interesting opinion as to the practical considerations behind the
doctrine of forum non conveniens:
There is and has been, in a mid-western state, a highly organized law firm,
complete with "bird dogs" or solicitors, fee-splitting contracts with lay-
men, ambulances fully equipped with sirens and red lights, who contact
the injured railway employee or his next of kin, at times before a physician
can see the claimant....
This writer, basing this opinion on personal knowledge obtained as a prac-
ticing lawyer and as a former officer of the Montana Bar Association con-
dudes, without any reservation, that this firm, a detriment to the legal
profession, is as free from ethical practice as a brick is from oil. It can be
safely assumed that the proximate cause of the twelve states adopting the
legal principle of "forum non conveniens" comes as the end result of this
firm's activities, or other law firms using the same general unethical tactics.
(Id. at 476, 365 P.2d at 524).
Little specific authority can be offered in support of Justice Doyle's assertions, but
see Atchison, T. &c S.F. Ry. v. District Court, 298 P.2d 427, 430 (Okla. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956) (doctrine is "an attempt to stop the wholesale in-
discriminate importation of foreign causes of action in this jurisdiction") and Price
v. Atchison, T. Sc S.F. Ry., 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 839 (1954). Query: What, if any, weight has this type of thinking had in the
decision of motions for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
F.E.L.A. actions, especially in light of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia ex. rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), which holds that some of the
union practices described above are not the unauthorized practice of law? Justice
Doyle also suggests that the doctrine may be of more importance to those jurisdic-
tions with a non-integrated bar because of the greater difficulty in controlling un-
desirable practices. This contention seems to be supported by the fact that the doc-
trine is accepted by 59% of those jurisdictions with non-integrated bars and
favorably considered by another 9% but is only accepted in 34Y% of those juris-
dictions with an integrated bar.
30. 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589 (1956). The case is discussed in 1957 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 165; 4 ST.L.U.L.J. 198 (1956).
31. For a fuller detailing of defendant's conduct leading ultimately to abso-
lution from liability for defendant's insurer see Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. John-
ston, 146 F. Supp. 5 (D. Ran. 1956), affd, 250 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1957).
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trial of the causes in Missouri."38 The Second Mayfield Case and other
prior Missouri cases34 were distinguished because:
[1] [T]here have been several Missouri cases which involved the
doctrine but the fact was not recognized or fully appreciated .... 35
[2] [I]n addition there was present one significant factor which
gave all those cases some nexus with Missouri and its courts.386
The court pointed out that in all prior cases this nexus was supplied by
the fact that the defendant was either a railroad with tracks or an agent
in Missouri, or an insurance company which had authorized service of
process upon the superintendent of insurance. "[I]f they were not in point
of fact citizens and residents of Missouri, they were residents for purpose
of suit."3 7 The court did not mention Artide I, Section 14 of the Missouri
Constitution or Section 507.020, RSMo 1949, both of which were deemed
decisive in the Second Mayfield Case. The "privileges and immunities
clause" argument raised in the Mayfield Cases was obviated because the
court had looked to the residency of the parties, saying that "distinction or
denial based in part not upon citizenship but upon residence has some basis
and validity and is not wholly unreasonable."38
In Loftus v. Lee89 the Missouri Supreme Court again considered the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. It held the doctrine was not repug-
nant to Article I, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution 40 and Section
507.020, RSMo 194941 stating:
When Section 14 is considered in its entirety and complete context,
it is found to mean that our courts are open to every person to the
end that justice be neither denied or delayed. ... Therefore, while
there can be no doubt that our constitution and general venue stat-
utes make it the policy of this State that our courts shall be open
to every person ... it is also a primary constitutional duty of courts
to function to the end that right and justice be administered with-
out sale, denial, or delay.... [N]either... were intended to mean
that our courts be required to submit to an abuse of their process
by non-residents.42
In Loftus the trial court dismissed a suit between the two residents of the
metropolitan Kansas City, Kansas area involving an automobile collision
which had taken place in Kansas City, Kansas. The defendant was served
with process in Jackson County, Missouri while attending business school,
her only contact with the state of Missouri. It was held that the trial court
33. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 886, 292 S.W.2d 589, 593 (1956).
34. See cases note 23 supra.
35. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 884, 292 S.W.2d 589, 591 (1956).
36. Id. at 889, 292 S.W.2d at 595.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 888, 292 S.W.2d at 595.
39. 308 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. 1958) (K.C. Bar Association appeared as amicus
curiae for appellant).
40. See note 20 supra.
41. See note 21 supra.
42. 308 S.W.2d 654, 660 (Mo. 1958).
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had abused its discretion by applying forum non conveniens to dismiss the
action on these facts, although the acceptability of the doctrine in Missouri
was affirmed.
Both Elliott4s and Loftust4 were careful to distinguish F.E.L.A. actions
from non-statutory types of tort action in the application of forum non
conveniens. But, as the discussion above has shown, these cases had com-
pletely repudiated the rationale of the Second Mayfield Case. The instant
case, State ex rel. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Riederer45 was a predictable46
extention of the doctrine in Missouri, bringing the state in line with other
jurisdictions which have decided that issueY. It is significant to note that
the court in Riederer stated that the "basic factors to be weighed", when
the court is considering a motion under the doctrine, apply equally to
43. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 884, 292 S.W.2d 589, 591 (1956).
44. Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Mo. 1958).
45. 454 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
46. Note, Discretionary Power to Decline Jurisdiction-Forum Non Conveni-
ens, 4 ST.L.U.L.J. 198, 202 (1956).
47. In eight jurisdictions the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been used
to dismiss suit arising under F.E.L.A. or the Jones Act. California: Price v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Cal.2d 577, 268 P.2d 457 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839 (1954);
Florida: Southern Ry. v. Bowling, 129 So.2d 433 (Fla. App. 1961), but see Adams
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 224 So.2d 797 (Fla. App. 1969); Illinois: People ex. Tel.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Donovan, 30 Ill.2d 178, 195 N.E.2d 634 (1964); Minnesota:
Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W.2d 763 (1954); Hill v.
Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 89 N.W.2d 654 (1958) (Jones Act);
New Jersey: Vargas v. A.H. Bull Steamship Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39
(1957), aff'd, 25 N.J. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958)
(Jones Act); New York: e.g., Williams v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 9 App. Div.2d
268, 193 N.Y. Supp.2d 588 (1959); Maloney v. State, 2 App. Div.2d 195, 154
N.Y. Supp.2d 132 (1956), affd, 3 N.Y.2d 356, 165 N.Y. Supp.2d 465, 144 N.E.2d 364
(1957) (Jones Act); Oklahoma: Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. District Court, 298 P.2d
427 (Okla. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 879 (1956); Pennsylvania: Rini v. New
York Cent. R.R., 429 Pa. 235, 240 A.2d 372 (1968); Walker v. Ohio River Co., 416Pa. 149, 205 A.2d 43 (1964) (Jones Act).
In three jurisdictions the doctrine has been specfically accepted for F.E.L.A.
actions but no case has arisen on appeal where the doctrine has been applied to
dismiss an action. Kansas: Gonzales v. Atchison, T. Sc S.F. Ry., 189 Kan. 689, 371
P.2d 193 (1962); Missouri: State ex tel. Chicago, R.I. Sc Pac. R.R. v. Riederer, 454
S.W.2d 36 (Mo. En Banc 1970); Utah: Mooney v. Denver &c R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah
307, 221 P.2d 628 (1950) (accepting the doctrine) and 123 Utah 224, 257 P.2d 947
(1953) (same case, approving doctrine's application).
One other jurisdiction may have accepted the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens for use in F.E.L.A. actions. Montana: State ex. tel. Great N. Ry., 139 Mont.
453, 365 P.2d 512 (1961).
In two jurisdictions opinions suggest that the doctrine would be available in
the proper situation. Georgia: Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, 71
S.E.2d 243 (1952), rezld, 345 U.S. 379 (1952); Indiana: Kern v. Cleveland C., C. &c
St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933); Cleveland, C., C. &c St. L. Ry. v.
Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N.E. 328 (1933). (These cases approve the use of in-
junctions against residents of the state to enjoin them from proceeding in F.E.L.A.
actions brought in another state. This practice was specifically disapproved by the
Supreme Court. Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379 (1952). Neverthe-
less, the language of the state opinions evince acceptance of the philosophy behind
the doctrine of forum non conveniens). See also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pope,
93 Ga. App. 550, 92 S.E.2d 300 (1956).
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F.E.L.A. and non-F.E.L.A. cases. 48 That is to say, the standard for dis-
missal is the same in all transitory cases in the nature of a tort.
The question then remains: under what circumstances may the court
exercise its discretion to dismiss an action under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens? The answer in Missouri is unclear. In the instant case Judge
Finch states that the factors to consider
include place of accrual of the cause of action, location of the
witnesses, the residence of the parties, any nexus with the place of
suit, the public factor of the convenience to and burden upon the
court, and the availability to plaintiff of another court with juris-
diction of the cause of action which affords him a forum for his
remedy.49
The court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss under the doctrine, apparently
enters into a balancing test with the above mentioned factors. More im-
portantly, however, it enters into the balancing test with the presumption
that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be overturned except "when
the ends of justice require it."G0 With this in mind let us consider the
meaning of these factors and their relative weight:
(1) The availability to the plaintiff of another forum. It is black let-
ter law in all jurisdictions that before the court may exercise the doctrine
of forum non conveniens to dismiss an action there must be a reasonably
suitable alternate forum where the action may be brought.51
(2) Place of accrual of the cause of action; residency of the parties. The
California Supreme Court has read Missouri law as defining "forum non
conveniens as a doctrine that applies when all litigants are non-residents." 52
Elliott uses language (reproduced in Loftus) which suggests that the doc-
trine requires not only non-residency of the parties but also that the cause
of action accrue outside the court's jurisdiction.53 If this is the rule, and
48. 454 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
49. Id.
50. Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 661 (Mo. 1958).
51. Missouri courts have not decided whether they will accept a waiver of the
statute of limitations in the more appropriate jurisdiction by the defendant. Like-
wise, it is not settled if the court will accept the defendant's offer of submission
to the jurisdiction of a foreign court where he is otherwise not able to be served
with process. See discussion note 4 supra; RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 84, comment e at 313 (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, 1967).
52. Thomson v. Continental Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 738, 59 Cal. Rptr. 101, 427
P.2d 765, 769 (1967).
53. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 886, 292 S.W.2d 589, 593 (1956) states:
The parties are all nonresidents, the actions or claims are upon a foreign
transitory nonstatutory tort and the court has the inherent discretionary
power to retain or to decline jurisdiction of these actions....
This language is reproduced in Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Mo. 1958).
See also Sharp v. Sharp, 416 S.W.2d 691 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967), stating that forum
non conveniens does not apply in divorce suit when, at the time the suit was
brought, both parties were residents.
Rationale. (1) The court may be reluctant to dismiss an action brought by a
resident plaintiff on policy grounds analogous to those enunciated in the May-field Cases concerning citizens. See text accompanying note 19 supra. But cf. White
v. Southern Pac. Co., 586 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1965), where a resident plaintiff's suit by
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that is not certain,54 then the doctrine of forum non conveniens has an
unusually limited sphere of applicability in Missouri. 55
(3) Nexus with the place of suit. "Nexus" is a term used almost ex-
clusively in Missouri courts. It is also a term the court has not sought to
define. "Nexus" would seem, however, to be some quantum of contact with
the forum state, presumably more than being "found" in the state for service
of process but less than residency.5 6 A finding of "nexus" would seem to
weigh substantially in favor of jurisdiction being retained.57 A strict in-
terpretation of the concept of "nexus" would probably limit even further
the usefulness of the doctrine as a practical tool of judicial management.
(4) Convenience to and burden upon the court and the public. This
factor has been taken to embrace considerations such as congested court
dockets, the added burden of jury duty placed on local residents by transi-
sory actions, and the avoidance of problems arising in conflict of laws.58
A finding that the public and court are burdened by a suit weighs against
the retention of jurisdiction. In Elliott the court apparently decided to
dismiss on the basis of the "public factors" involved.5 9 This led some
writers to conclude that Missouri courts had adopted a "liberal" and un-
conventional stance in the application of the doctrine.60 It is submitted
that in Elliott the court was concerned with the "public factors" because
of the inequitable conduct of the parties.6 1 In the absence of inequitable
foreign attachment against foreign corp. was dismissed as an undue burden on com-
merce. (2) If the defendant is a resident his inconvenience might be viewed as
greatly lessened. But see Winsor v. United Airlines, Inc., 52 Del. 161, 154 A.2d 561(Del. Super. 1958). (3) If the action accrued in the forum state, retention of juris-
diction may be viewed as desirable because local law will govern and usually most
witnesses will reside in the state. RE.rATEImNT (SEcoND) oF CONFLIcr OF LAWs
§ 84, comment f at 314 (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, 1967).
54. It must be remembered that neither Elliott nor Loftus raised this ques-
tion on their facts. Riederer might have raised the issue but did not.
55. Presumably the doctrine would not apply in the fact situation where a
foreign corporation, doing business in the forum state, is sued by a nonresident in
tort (as in Riederer). Ironically this type of litigation makes up the bulk of foreign
born causes of action and is often said to be the main target of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
56. As discussed previously, the court in Elliott used the term "nexus" to dis-
tinguish that case on the facts from earlier Missouri cases. Neither party in Elliott
was said to have any nexus with the state while in the earlier cases the defendant
railroads and insurance companies had nexus and were, therefore, "residents for
purpose of suit." Elliott v. Johnston, 565 Mo. 881, 889, 292 S.W.2d 589, 595 (1956).
In Loftus the court said that since both parties lived in Kansas City, Kansas, and the
defendant attended school in Kansas City, Missouri, "it would seem that a 'nexus'
of community integration, such as transportation facilities, etc., would have a bear-
ing upon the question of 'inconvenience' ... ." Loftus v. Lee, 808 S.W.2d 654, 660
(Mo. 1958).
57. Presumably, nexus is just one factor the court considers. A lack of
nexus is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of a motion to dismiss but it
is a very significant factor.
58. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 350 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
59. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589 (1956).
60. Comment, Discretionary Power to Decline Jurisdiction-Forum Non Con-
veniens, 1957 WAsH. U.L.Q. 165, 169; Note, Discretionary Power to Decline Juris-
diction-Forum Non Conveniens, 4 ST. L.U.L.J. 198, 201 (1956).
61. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 887, 292 S.W.2d 589, 594 (1956).
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conduct by the litigants, it would seem the "public factors" are rather sec-
ondary to other factors in the court's formula.62
(5) Relative convenience to and burden upon the parties. Missouri
has generated little case law that indicates what constitutes sufficient in-
convenience to the defendant to support a dismissal under forum non con-
veniens.3 Loftus uses language, however, that indicates the alleged incon-
venience must be of a serious nature. 4 Loftus also discusses the burden of
proof that is required. The inconvenience must be demonstrated to, in fact,
exist by a "clear showing."65 A strict application of these requirements
would seem to limit even further the area where dismissal would be avail-
able. Furthermore, apparently the plaintiff may show why a dismissal
would inconvenience him, 66 thereby allowing the court to weigh the rela-
tive inconveniences.
In the decade and a half since Elliott adopted forum non conveniens
for Missouri, only two cases have risen on appeal concerning the doctrine. 7
The reason for this lethargic reception might be, in the light of the above
analysis, that the scope of applicability of the doctrine has been so limited
that it is of little practical use. Whatever the reasons, it seems dear that
so far the doctrine has neither been the disaster its detractors predicted nor
the boon to judicial management its supporters hoped.
PETER C. BAGGERMAN
62. Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Mo. 1958) suggests conduct of plain-
tiff in part designed to "vex, harass or oppress" may be inequitable, .... [blut un-
less the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the ... choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed."
63. No case has really gotten to this factor. The cases have decided the issue
on one of the previous factors.
64. The fact that a trial could be had in Kansas in six months but the parties
would have to wait eighteen months in Missouri does not constitute sufficient in-
convenience. Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 661 (Mo. 1958). Loftus also quotes
with approval language from Bavuso v. Angwin, 166 Kan. 469, 201 P.2d 1057
(1949) indicating that the inconvenience to the defendant must be of an almost
disabling nature. Id. It should be noted, however, that Bavuso deals with enjoin-
ing a Kansas citizen from bringing a suit in another jurisdiction. This is concep-
tually quite different from forum non conveniens. RETmATEMNT (SECOND) oF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 84, comment h at 314 (Proposed Official Draft, Part I, 1967).
65. Loftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Mo. 1958). The difficulty in requir-
ing a "dear showing of inconvenience is that it is difficult to show, before the case
is tried, just how disadvantaged the defendant actually will be in terms of time,
money, availability of foreign witnesses, etc. See State ex. rel. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S.W. 483 (En Banc 1911).
66. In Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589 (1956), the court
considered plaintiff's claim that bringing the suit in Missouri would be to his ad-
vantage because of the nine-man jury verdict. In this instance, however, the conten-
tion was dismissed as of little merit.
67. A similar situation exists in approximately two-thirds of the jurisdictions
nominally accepting the doctrine.
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EQUAL PROTECTION-A JUDICIAL CEASE FIRE
IN THE WAR ON POVERTY?
Dandridge v. Williams'
Appellees, citizens of Maryland and recipients of benefits under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,2 brought suit
to enjoin the application of the Maryland "maximum grant regulation"
whereby an absolute limit of $250 per month was placed on the amount
of benefits received by a single AFDC family regardless of need.$ Specif-
ically the appellees alleged that the maximum grant limitation was not
compatible with the Social Security Act of 1935, 4 and was in conflict with
its explicit provisions,5 and moreover that it violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.6
A three judge District Court held that the Maryland maximum grant regu-
lation violated the equal protection clause.7 On direct appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed in a 5-3 decision, holding that the maximum grant regula-
tion was not inconsistent with the Social Security Act and was not violative
of the equal protection clause.
Speaking for the majority s Mr. Justice Stewart began his statutory
1. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
3. The need of each family is determined by standards formulated by the
Maryland Department of Social Services. Although families of six or less could re-
ceive aid commensurate with their determined need, families of seven and over
were limited to $250 per month in certain Maryland counties including Baltimore
City where the appellees resided, and $240 in other Maryland counties. Appellee
Williams had a computed need for her family of nine of $296.15 and appellee
Gary a computed need of $331.50 for her family of ten. Both, nevertheless, received
only $250 per month as provided by Maryland Department of Social Services, Rule
200 § X, B, at 23.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964).
5. § 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act of 1935 provides that aid shall be
furnished "to all eligible individuals." The appellees contended that the maximum
grant regulation denied all benefits to children born into a family already re-
ceiving the maximum grant. Furthermore, the appellees contended that the regula-
tion encourages the "farming out" of children to relatives not subject to the maxi-
mum limitation and thereby contravenes a basic purpose of the AFDC program.
6. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The appellees' contention was that the
maximum grant limitation operated to create two classes of recipients, i.e., small
families who received their calculated subsistence needs and large families similarly
situated who did not receive payments commensurate with their subsistence needs
and were thereby denied equal treatment.
7. 297 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Md. 1969). The lower courts had consistently in-
validated maximum grant regulations. See, e.g., Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp.
1109 (D.C. Me. 1969), and Lindsey v. Smith, 303 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D. Wash.
1969). A family maximum was held invalid under the equal protection clause of the
Iowa Constitution in Collins v. State Board of Social Welfare, 248 Iowa 369, 81
N.W.2d 4 (1957).
8. In addition to Mr. Justice Stewart, the majority included Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Black, White, and Harlan. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in a
lengthy opinion which did not deal with the constitutional question. Mr. Justice
Brennan joined by Mr. Justice Marshall concurred with Douglas' dissent and
further dissented on the constitutional question or what they termed "the Court's
emasculation of the equal protection clause."
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analysis regarding the alleged conflict between the Maryland regulation
and the Social Security Act by asserting that "the federal law gives each
state great latitude in dispensing its available funds."9 His interpretation
also recognized Congress's "full awareness" of maximum grant limitations. 10
These premises, and a reliance on the lack of disapproval of the state regu-
lations by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,1 led the
Court to the conclusion that the Maryland regulation was not prohibited
by the Social Security Act.
More significant, however, than the Court's interpretation 2 of the
Social Security Act13 is the Court's holding on the constitutional question
and the basis for that holding. It is the purpose of this note to briefly com-
ment on the recent development of the law in the area of equal protection
and to analyze the significance of the Dandridge holding in light of that
development.
Elementary principles of constitutional law recognize that states may
make statutory classifications which discriminate against certain individuals,
if the classifications created include all persons similarly situated and justi-
fication for the differential treatment is present.' 4 The type of justification
9. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970).
10. This "full awareness" is manifested in 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (1964) to which
Congress added subsection 23 in 1967. That subsection called for reflection of
changes in costs of living in determining family needs and further provided that
"any maximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families
will have been proportionately adjusted." See note 13 infra. In his dissent Mr.
Justice Douglas pointed out that "congressional reference to an existing practice
does not automatically imply approval of that practice."
11. The majority opinion states that "[t]he Secretary (of HEW) has not dis-
approved any state plan because of its maximum grant provision." Contrast this
language with that of the District Court in Williams v. Dandridge:
In view of the fact, however, that there is no indication from administrative
decision, promulgated regulation, or departmental statement that the
question of the conformity of maximum grants to the Act has been given
considered treatment, we believe that the various actions and inactions on
the part of HEW are not entitled to substantial, much less decisive, weight
in our consideration of the instant case. 297 F. Supp. 450, 460 (D.C. Md.
1969).
See also 67 COLUm. L. RFv. 84, 91 (1967), where the author discusses the inadequacy
of the federal administrative forum and HEW reluctance to impose effective
sanctions where state welfare plans operate inconsistently with federal law.
12. Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent termed the court's interpretation of the
Social Security Act a "misreading." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970).
13. Dandridge, in conjunction with Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), de-
cided on the same day, will have an adverse effect on efforts to improve welfare
conditions by challenges to the Social Security Act. See May, Supreme Court Ap-
proves Maximum Grants; Holds § 402 (a) (23) Permits Welfare Cuts, 3 CLEAMNc,-
HousE RviEw 321 (1970). In Rosado, the Court in part held that § 402 (a) (23) of
the Social Security Act, which requires the states to make cost of living adjustments
in their determination of standards of need and dollar maximums, does not pre-
dude the states from subsequently "par (ing) down payments to accommodate
budgetary realities by reducing the percent of benefits paid or switching to a per-
cent reduction system." In effect, the holding in Rosado allows the states to offset
increases in welfare payments which otherwise would have resulted from compliance
with § 402 (a) (23).
14. Douglas, Equal Protection-A New Application to Illegitimates, 34 Mo.
L. REv. 271 (1969). See generally Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALTF. L. RPv. 341 (1949).
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needed varies depending upon the type of legislation involved. A trichotomy
has arisen between the treatment afforded economic, civil rights, and racial
classifications. In general, the Court has traditionally given "great latitude"
to the state legislatures when applying the equal protection clause to eco-
nomically related legislation, while remaining "extremely sensitive" when
dealing with civil rights.15 Furthermore, racial classifications are viewed
by the Court as "constitutionally suspect."'16
The abstention of the Court in regard to legislation affecting com-
mercial transactions has been applied with strong conviction. Indeed, the
Court has succinctly stated it does not "sit as a super-legislature to weigh
the wisdom" of laws that touch economic problems and business affairs. 17
The Court has consistently upheld economic regulatory legislation' s which
merely has some "rational basis"'19 and only rarely has the Court invalidated
such legislation over the past thirty years.20 Thus, the "fundamental stand-
ard"2 1 in the area of state regulation of business or industry is whether any
set of facts may reasonably be conceived as justification for the discrimina-
tion.22 Consequently, a heavy burden rests on the attacking party to over-
come the assumption that the classification has some rational basis.
In sharp contrast to the Court's treatment of economic classifications
is its activist role in using the equal protection clause in racial discrimina-
tion cases. 23 If one were to view the equal protection clause as a spectrum 24
with economic classifications at one extreme, the opposite extreme would
consist of racial classifications. 25 Here the Court has applied its most
stringent standards and has demanded that racial classifications be sub-
jected to the "most rigid scrutiny." 26 Indeed, racial classifications are
viewed as "constitutionally suspect '2 7 and have been termed "invidious per
15. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
16. See note 27 infra.
17. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
18. E.g., R.E.A. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). See generally 16A
C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 510, 511 (1965).
19. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580 (1935).
This case offers an early example of the Court's traditional treatment of economic
classifications which are challenged on equal protection grounds. The Court stated
that an assumption of the classification's rationality exists and "a statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside-if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it." (emphasis added).
20. The one major exception has been Morey v. Doud, 345 U.S. 457 (1957).
See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Na-
tural-Law-Due-Process Formula." 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 716, 722 (1969).
21. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
22. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
23. The Court in Dandridge noted that no contentions were made that the
maximum grant limitation was "infected" with a racially discriminatory purpose.
24. This linear treatment is necessary for a simplified analysis. For a more
sophisticated approach see Karst, note 20 supra and Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 H v. L. R-v. 91, 95 (1966).
25. See generally 81 HAtv. L. Rxv. 1511 (1968).
26. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
27. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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se."28 In effect, a heavy burden of justification is placed upon the state
when a statute is drawn according to race, and only some "legitimate over-
riding purpose" can sustain its validity.2 9
The above described standards for equal protection analysis, although
simplified here,8 0 nevertheless serve as guideposts in setting the stage for
a discussion of the "middle ground" cases on the equal protection spectrum
wherein the Court has expanded the application of the equal protection
doctrine in recent years.3 1
Leaning toward the stringent racial standard are those classifications
involving discrimination against basic civil rights. They have prompted
the "new equal protection cases" which are subjected to an "extremely
flexible sliding scale for measuring the required degree of intensity of judi-
cial scrutiny of the legislative classification."3 2 In effect, the characteriza-
tion of a given fact situation as involving a basic right such as procreation,3 8
voting,3 4 reapportionment,8 5 marriage,3 6 interstate travel,37 or the rights
of illegitimate children38 dictated adherence to a constitutional standard
far more stringent than the economic standard and nearly as stringent as
the racial standard. 9 Thus, when dealing with human, civil, or individual
rights40 the Court had, prior to Dandridge, taken an activist role in ex-
panding the application of the equal protection clause. The burden of
justifying these classifications rested upon the state and only a "compelling
28. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964). (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Justices Douglas and Stewart stated
in a concurring opinion that they can conceive of no purpose which could justify a
racial classification for a criminal offense. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198
(1964).
30. See note 24 supra.
31. Note that Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 14 at 381, predicted in 1949
that the equal protection clause was about to enter "the most fruitful and significant
period of its career." Prior to Dandridge, their prophecy had indeed shown some
validity.
32. Karst, supra note 20 at 744.
33. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Court there termed pro-
creation a "fundamental" right.
34. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
36. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Note that this case also involved
racial discrimination. In regard to marriage, the Court termed it "one of the basic
civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival."
37. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also U.S. v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966) where the Court declared the right to travel interstate as "funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union." (emphasis added).
38. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
39. Generally speaking, it should be noted that in applying a more stringent
constitutional standard in non-racial cases the Court did not differentiate consti-
tutionally based rights such as interstate travel, and those rights of a fundamental
nature such as procreation. Thus, if the Court considered a right "fundamental," it
was elevated to the status of a constitutionally based right and a similar standard
was applied in either case. Following Dandridge the distinction between funda-
mental rights and constitutionally based rights will probably become more signifi-
cant. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
40. Tussman and tenBroek, supra, note 14. See also 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 264,
270-78 (1964) and 82 HARv. L. R.y. 1065, 1128-29 (1969).
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interest' 41 of the state could overcome the Court's willingness to strike
down the legislation.
Thus, prior to Dandridge one could generally segregate equal protec-
tion cases into the three rather distinct categories of economic regulation,
civil rights, and racial discrimination and the characterization of the facts
before the Court would to a large extent dictate the standard applied and
the Court's ultimate decision. Such categorization inevitably resulted in
some inconsistencies and criticism,4 2 but it enabled the Court to approach
pragmatically the constitutional questions involved. In effect, the Court
had the judicial tools to develop and protect individual rights in a
manner consistent with the changing attitudes and values of society. Such
development in relation to the welfare rights of the poor entered a new
frontier in Shapiro v. Thompsona decided by the Court one year prior
to Dandridge.
In Shapiro, the Court declared the Connecticut one year residency re-
quirement for welfare recipients unconstitutional. The asserted basis for
the Court's holding was infringement of the constitutional right to inter-
state travel. 44 The existence of a basic civil right in Shapiro invoked the
stringent equal protection standard of the states' showing of a "compelling"
governmental interest justifying a classification curtailing the exercise of
that right.45 Failure by the state to sustain this burden resulted in the
Court's conclusion that the classification constituted invidious discrimina-
tion and a denial of equal protection of the laws.
However, beyond the Court's protection of the right to interstate travel
in Shapiro lies the "crux" of the decision, 46 namely, that food, clothing, and
shelter are fundamental human needs. 47 As stated in the majority opinion
of Mr. Justice Brennan:
41. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
42. Consider, for example, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), where
the Court upheld a Michigan statute which denied bartender licenses to females
unless they were the daughter or wife of the tavern owner. The Court considered
the problem as purely economic although sex discrimination is surely susceptible
to characterization as a problem involving basic civil rights. Contrasting criticism
has been lodged at the Court's willingness to expand the doctrine of basic civil
rights or fundamental interests. See in this regard the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969), where he says
"I know of nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human ac-
tivities, characterize them as "fundamental" and give them added protection under
an unusually stringent equal protection test." See also 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1132
(1969). But cf. P. FREUND, OF LAw AND JusncE 35 (1968).
43. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
44. Id. at 629. See also note 37 supra.
45. Id. at 634.
46. 44 N.Y.U.L. Ryv. 989, 1013 (1969).
47. Id. See also, 4 GA. L. R.V. 203 (1969); 17 WEr.FR L. BULL. 28 (1969);
Douglas, Feeding the Hungry, 5 HARv. Civ. RlGirrs-Crv. Lm. L. R.v. 440, 453
(1969); 83 HAnv. L. R.mv. 7 (1969); Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare
Assistance, 31 ALBANY L. Rlv. 210 (1967); and Rothstein v. Wyman, 303 F. Supp.
339, 346 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), where the Court stated: "[W]ithout . .. [the bare
minimums required for existence,] our expressed fundamental constitutional rights
and liberties frequently cannot be exercised and therefore become meaningless."
1971]
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On the basis of this sole difference 48 the... class is denied welfare
aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain
the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessities of
life .... 49
Thus, Shapiro could have been a "way station" leading to an ultimate
conclusion that welfare assistance is a right.50
However, the approach of the Dandridge Court clearly avoided con-
fronting the issue for which Shapiro laid the apparent groundwork. Even
though the maximum grant limitation has the effect of denying any wel-
fare assistance to a child born into a family already receiving maximum
benefit, 51 and the Court conceded that "welfare assistance . . . involves
the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,"52 the
Court chose to apply the equal protection standard normally reserved
for economic classifications. In so doing the Court recognized the "dramat-
ically real factual differences between the cited cases and this one." 53 This
admission in and of itself, serves as a "candid recognition" that the Court's
decision was wholly without precedent and an "emasculation" of the equal
protection doctrine.54
48. The difference being the absence or presence of one year of residency.
49. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 (1969).
50. Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 AimANY L.
Rnv. 210 (1967); Bendich, Privacy, Poverty and the Constitution, 54 CALrF. L. RxEv.
407 (1966); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YAim L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965); 3 GA. L. REv. 459 (1969); 44 N.Y.U.L. REv.
989, 1013 (1969); 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 451, 475 (1968). Further, as the Supreme Court
noted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) welfare and the subsistence
it provides may be a prerequisite to the exercise of even the most basic rights:
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential
food, clothing, housing, and medical care .... Termination of aid . . .
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live ....
Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately
desperate ....
From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come
to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to
their poverty.... Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence,
can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the com-
munity.
51. It is interesting to note that the majority viewed the maximum grant regu-
lation as diminishing the lot of the entire family rather than denying benefits to
the child born into the family already receiving their maximum grant. Thus, the
majority considered it sufficient that "some aid" was provided to all children.
This interpretation is in sharp conflict with the analysis of Justice Douglas that the
AFDC program is intended for the underprivileged dependent children and not
for the individuals who apply for aid in behalf of those children. See note 5 supra.
52. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
53. Id. Some of the cases referred to by the majority are McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (licenses for female bartenders); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (riverboat pilots regulation); Metropolis Theatre v.
City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913) (theater license ordinance); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas, 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (natural gas statute).
54. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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A comparison of Dandridge with previous equal protection cases illus-
trates that the majority departs from established precedent. In Skinner v.
Oklahoma55 the Court recognized that procreation is a fundamental right
as it struck down a state statute which interfered with that right. Arguably,
a similar fundamental interest was at stake in Dandridge in that the max-
imum grant limitation discouraged reproduction by families already re-
ceiving their maximum grant and thereby infringed upon their right to
procreate. 56 More directly in point is the analogy between Lev, v. Louisi-
ana57 and Dandridge. In Levy, the Court recognized the right of illegit-
imate children to sue for the wrongful death of their parents,58 stating that
"the rights asserted here involve the intimate familial relationship between
a child and his mother." 59 Obviously, Dandridge could be characterized
as involving identical rights in that the AFDC program is specifically
directed toward assisting welfare mothers in caring for their children. Never-
theless, the majority overtly failed to recognize the similarity in circum-
stances.
Shapiro v. Thompson 69 provides an additional basis for questioning
the Dandridge reasoning. The District Court in Williams v. Dandridge6'
emphatically stated that:
... the evidence before us at the original trial was crystal-clear
that the only reason why the maximum grant regulation was con-
tinued was financial, i.e., that... Maryland had failed to appro-
priate sufficient funds to finance the cost of AFDC, absent the
operative effect of the maximum grant regulation in reducing ex-
penditures.6 2
55. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
56. Appellees did argue that the right to procreate was infringed upon by the
maximum grant limitation, but the majority made no mention of this contention.
57. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
58. In the companion case of Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability In-
surance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), the Court held that a mother has a right to sue
for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child on equal protection grounds. See
Douglas, supra, note 13. See generally Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate,
65 Micat. L. REv. 477 (1966).
59. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
60. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
61. 297 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Md. 1969).
62. Id. at 467. The eventual reasons Maryland advanced to justify the maxi-
mum grant regulation were:
(1) encouraging gainful employment;
(2) maintaining an equitable balance in economic status between welfare
families and those supported by a wage-earner;
(3) providing incentives for family planning;
(4) and allocating funds to meet the needs of more families. 397 U.S. 471,
483.484 (1970).
The Supreme Court dealt only with the first two grounds and recognized their in-
herent weaknesses. Regarding the first, the Court stated: "[I]t is true that in some
AFDC families there may be no person who is employable". Id. at 486. Further-
more, in regard to (2) above, that "[i]t is also true that with respect to AFDC
families whose determined standard of need is below the regulatory maximum, and
who therefore receive grants equal to the determined standard, the employment in-
centive is absent." Id. The validity of these "justifications" becomes more question-
able when one also considers that all of them were absent at the original trial.
Nevertheless, they were suffident in the Court's eyes to be entertained as "legitimate
state interests." Id. at 483. See also 3 CLERINGHOUSE RVEW 12, at 346-47 (1970).
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The Supreme Court in Shapiro, however, refused to recognize the saving
of welfare costs as a valid justification for an otherwise invidious classifica-
tion. When these facts are added to the observation that nutrition and sub-
sistence are susceptible to characterization as rights certainly as fundamental
as the right to procreateG3 or marry6 4 it is apparent that the holding in
Dandridge might represent a new attitude by the Supreme Court in dealing
with future fundamental interest "middle ground" cases on the equal pro-
tection spectrum.6 5
Possibly the best vehicles for initially examining this new attitude are
the opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan, whose dissent in Shapiro appears to
have laid the immediate foundation for the Dandridge holding. He ex-
pressed displeasure with the Court's practice of choosing particular human
activities, labeling them fundamental rights, and consequently giving them
the added protection of a stringent equal protection test.6 6 Harlan would
apply the same equal protection standard to all cases without regard to "the
nature of the classification or (the) interest involved."67 In effect, he
advocates the application of the traditional economic standard of "some
rational basis" to all classifications except racial ones, for which historical
factors dictate a stricter standard. Although this type of analysis offers the
courts a more predictable and clearcut standard for dealing with equal
protection cases, it does not allow for a weighing of the validity of the fac-
tors involved in legislative classifications touching on individual rights or
fundamental interests. Nevertheless, the majority in Dandridge has at least
partially adopted the views of Mr. Justice Harlan. The question then be-
comes-how far will this new line of reasoning extend on the equal protec-
tion spectrum?
Due to the imprecise and unexpounded nature of the majority opinion,
one may only speculate as to the interests which will hereafter be subjected
to the inherently restrained traditional equal protection standard formerly
reserved for economic classifications. Nonetheless, it is generally clear that
the heavy burden previously placed upon the states in justifying classifica-
tions dealing with individual rights and fundamental interests has been
lifted unless the discrimination involved is racial.68 Although the Court
may continue to utilize the equal protection clause in protecting certain
constitutionally based rights69 such as voting,70 criminal prosecution pro-
63. See note 33 supra.
64. See note 36 supra.
65. It is probable that the Court will continue to apply a stringent standard
to "middle ground" equal protection cases if a constitutionally based right such as
interstate travel is at issue. See note 69 infra. See also note 37 supra.
66. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See also note 42 supra containing the language of Justice Harlan.
67. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970), (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 884 U.S. 641, 660-661
(1966).
68. See note 23 supra.
69. The language of the majority in Dandridge which indicates future use of
the equal protection clause to protect constitutionally based rights is as follows:
"For here we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affect.
ing freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, . . " Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 484, (1970) (emphasis added).
70. See note 34 supra.
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cedures, 71 and interstate travel, 72 it is probable that rights previously
viewed as fundamental, such as marriage73 and procreation,74 will now
move to the economic and social end of the equal protection spectrum and
consequently fail to qualify as basic civil rights worthy of a more stringent
equal protection standard. Thus, the Court indicates that all classifica-
tions, unless racial or involving freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,7 5
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.76
For example, although Levy v. Louisiana7 7 recognized wrongful death
interests of illegitimates as being a civil right, it is now possible that similar
rights in regard to intestate succession 78 and child support will be categor-
ized merely as social conditions. Similar treatment is likely to be directed
toward educational classifications of a non-racial nature.79 Thus, although
education is commonly considered an interest of a fundamental nature in
our society, any corresponding Supreme Court development along these
lines is presently improbable in light of Dandridge and the lack of explicit
constitutional language protecting educational opportunities.
Thus, the immediate effect of Dandridge on welfare rights may be
indicative of a far-reaching negative effect and judicially restrained ap-
proach in areas where the equal protection clause formerly provided flex-
ibility in developing "new frontiers in equality."8 ° Indeed, Dandridge v.
Williams may bring renewed validity to the remark of Mr. Justice Holmes
that the equal protection clause is "the .. . last resort of constitutional
arguments."8 1 Certainly it is safe to say that the economic standard has
been expanded to include "social welfare"8 2 legislation, thus widening the
applicability of a "hands-off" approach in regard to welfare litigation.88
71. See e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
72. See note 37 supra.
73. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
74. Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex. rel. Williamson 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
75. See note 69 supra.
76. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). This language is indica-
tive of the traditionally restrained treatment afforded economic classifications. See
also note 18 supra.
77. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
78. See Douglas, supra note 14.
79. 82 H~Av. L. Rav. 1065, 1129 (1969). See generally A. WIsE, RIcH ScHooms,
POOR SCHOOLS 167 (1968).
80. 82 Haxv. L. REv., 1065, 1192 (1969).
81. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
82. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The majority referred
to "the area of economics and social welfare.... " It appears that Dandridge
was the first case wherein the Court classified social welfare in the same category
as economics, although the Court had previously used the phrase "social and
economic legislation." See, e. g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1967).
83. The apparent "hands-of' attitude in regard to welfare litigation is indi-
cated by the recent opinions of several Supreme Court Justices. For example, in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 284 (1970), Chief Justice Burger states in his dis-
sent:
I would not suggest that the procedures of administering the Nation's
complex welfare programs are beyond the reach of courts, but I would
wait until more is known about the problems before fashioning solutions
in the rigidity of a constitutional holding (emphasis added).
A similar attitude is indicated in Dandridge when the Court states, 397 U.S.
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This apparent retrenching by the Court will have an unfortunate effect
on recent efforts toward development of the rights of the poor.8 4 This is
particularly significant in relation to the predictions of various writers
that welfare assistance in and of itself could emerge as a right.8 5 In addi-
tion, although the facts in Dandridge were susceptible to the recognition
of subsistence as a right,8 6 the Court's holding apparently rejects any present
development along these lines. Instead the Court has, in regard to the
equal protection clause, chosen to cast the fate of the poor in the same light
as the interests of "a gas company or an optical dispenser."87 In sum, one
can only conclude that regardless of its previous participation in the war
on poverty, the Supreme Court has declared a judicial cease fire in the
utilization of the equal protection clause as a weapon of the poor.
BURTON W. NEWMAN
at 487: "TJhe Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public wel-
fare funds among the myriad of potential recipients."
And in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 422 (1970), the Court stated: "[We
view with concern the escalating involvement of federal courts in this highly
complicated area of welfare benefits ......
84. These recent efforts resulted in favorable decisions in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (cutting off welfare benefits without a prior hearing on the
merits declared unconstitutional); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (striking
down "substitute parent" or "man in the house" rule under which welfare benefits
were denied of there was evidence of a male living in the house) ; Edwards v. Habib,
397 F.2d 687 (D.C.Cir. 1968) cert. denied 393 U.S. 1016 (1969) (eviction of a
tenant because he made a complaint, i.e., retaliatory eviction, held unconstitu-
tional); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residency require-
ment for welfare eligibility declared unconstitutional); Javins v. First National
Realty Corp. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (warrant of habitability implied in
lease). Following Dandridge and Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the follow-
ing comment appeared in 3 CL NGHOUSE Rv., 321 (1970):
In a pair of decisions handed down on April 6, 1970, the Supreme Court
has severly crippled the effort of the welfare rights movement to improve
conditions of the poor through legal challenges brought under the Con-
stitution and the Social Security Act (emphasis added).
85. See note 50 supra. California has explicitly incorporated the vested rights
concept into its welfare statutes, See CALIF. WE.F. & INST'N § 10000 (West 1966) and
§ 10962 (West Supp. 1969).
86. See note 47 supra. Consider also § 25 (2) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, and sub-
scribed to by the United States:
"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the well being of him-
self and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and the
necessary social services.... ." (emphasis added).
87. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 529 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The reference is to Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) and
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION IN A WRONGFUL
DEATH CASE: SHOULD "REASONABLE MEDICAL
CERTAINTY" BE NECESSARY TO MAKE
A SUBMISSIBLE CASE?
Bailey v. Kershner'
Plaintiff, Alma Bailey, instituted a wrongful death action for the death
of her 70-year-old husband, Harold, against defendants Karl Kershner and
LeClaire Brothers Transfer, Inc. The action was based on a car-truck
collision wherein plaintiff's deceased was riding in defendant Kershner's
car. Kershner had slowed the car to make a left turn when it was struck
from, behind by the defendant corporation's truck. Kershner, fearing that
a quick stop would injure him and Bailey, did not apply the brakes, but
instead allowed the auto to continue in a circular path off the road. This
action caused Bailey to be thrown from the car onto a lawn. Bailey was
taken to a hospital where he was examined by Dr. Butts, who had previously
treated Bailey for high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis, and heart trouble.
Dr. Butts found that Bailey had extremely high blood pressure, bruises
and abrasions of the back, hip and forehead. The patient was placed on
medication to reduce pain and blood pressure. Bailey's condition improved
during the following week, but on the eighth day his condition began to
deteriorate and he finally died of a "cerebro-vascular accident," eleven days
after the collision.
The causal connection between the obvious injuries and the subsequent
death was the major issue at trial. Dr. Butts, the only medical witness,
testified that in his opinion the injuries directly contributed to the cerebral
vascular accident,2 but he would not state with "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" that the injuries were the cause of death.3 He would only say that
he felt at the time, that the injuries sustained in the accident were the cause
of death. Defendants moved for a directed verdict on the causation ques-
tion, but the trial court overruled this motion and plaintiff obtained a jury
verdict.
On appeal the defendants contended that plaintiff had not sustained
her burden of proving that the defendant's act was a cause of the deceased's
death. The Springfield Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants and
declared that expert testimony was essential because of the pre-existing
high blood pressure, arteriosclerotic hypertension and cardiac conditions and
the minor nature of the injuries sustained in the accident.4 The court also
held that "reasonable certainty" is necessary to make a submissible case
and, as a corollary to this, mere evidence that a causal connection alone is
"possible" would be insufficient. 5 Since the doctor only had a feeling that
the accident was the cause, and refused to state that his belief was based
on "reasonable medical certainty," the court held that the verdict must be
1. 444 S.W.2d 10 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 15.
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disregarded and the judgment reversed.6 Although the basis of the court's
holding was not unusual and added nothing to existing case law, the ap-
plication of the so-called "reasonable medical certainty" test in this factual
situation points up the problems and deficiencies inherent in the test. The
result was a reversal by the Springfield Court of Appeals on a question of
fact rather than law. This note will discuss these problems and propose
means of avoiding them.
Proof of causation is often a problem to both judges and attorneys.
But what must the plaintiff prove? Plaintiff, of course, has the burden of
proof on this question.7 In Missouri, the causal connection requirement
is expressed by the phrase "direct result."8 One test used to determine if
the injuries were the direct result of defendant's negligence is "whether
the facts show that absent the charged negligence, the injury would not
have been sustained."9 This is commonly known as the "but-for" test and
seems to be widely accepted in most jurisdictions including Missouri.10
However the "but-for" test, while appropriate for the purpose of establish-
ing a causal connection, is never, strictly speaking, appropriate for deter-
mining whether the injury or circumstance was a "direct" result, because
the latter requires more than a mere causal connection. The question of
causation is always for the jury" provided, of course, that judges agree
that there is substantial evidence to support a jury verdict on the point.
Exactly what constitutes substantial evidence is not dear. Some authors
have stated that it is an indefinable term.12 Despite this, it is clear that
the substantiality of the evidence necessary to make a submissible case de-
pends upon the fact situation and, in this respect, the Missouri courts have
implicitly recognized three different types of factual situations.
The first situation occurs where common knowledge of the likely effect
of an act is so widely held that a submissible case can be made without
any direct evidence on the issue.'3 Thus, circumstantial evidence alone may
be sufficient where deceased's head was crushed in an auto accident,' 4 or
where plaintiff suffered stomach pain from swallowing broken glass.' 5
Obviously, expert testimony is not needed in these instances.
In the second situation there are facts which tend to establish causa-
tion but which alone are insufficient for that purpose. In this second situa-
tion, if plaintiff can corroborate these facts with expert testimony as to
possibility of causation, the substantial evidence requirement is satisfied.
The facts in these cases often support a post hoc, ergo propter hoc theory
6. Id. at 15, 16.
7. Id. at 11; 25A C.J.S. Death § 87 (1966).
8. See Mo. Approved Instr. §§ 17.01 and 20.01 (1969).
9. 444 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969), citing James v. Sunshine Biscuits,
Inc., 402 S.W.2d 364, 375 (Mo. 1966).
10. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 41, at 242-43 (3d ed. 1964).
11. Pollard v. General Elevator Eng'r Co., 416 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1967) ; White-
head v. Schrick, 328 S.W.2d 170 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
12. Green, The Causal Relation in Negligence Law, 60 MicH. L. REv. 543,
554, citing H. HART - A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
13. 25A C.J.S. Death § 87, at 840-41 (1966).
14. Fellows v. Farmer, 379 S.W.2d 842 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964).
15. Bell v. S. S. Kresge Co., 129 S.W.2d 932 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939).
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of causation, i.e., plaintiff was in good health before the alleged negligence,
and in bad health afterwards. This evidence may nevertheless be sufficient,
if an expert testifies that the injury was possibly caused by the negligence.16
The third situation encompasses those cases where there is no obvious
causal connection so that expert testimony is essential if the burden of
proof is to be sustained. 17 The technical nature of the issue may be so far
outside the jury's knowledge and experience that no basis exists for in-
ferring the causal connection. For this reason expert testimony is indis-
pensable.1 8 In this third area, therefore, it is frequently said that substantial
evidence must be based on reasonable certainty,1 9 and that "possibility" 20
or even "probability" 21 by itself is insufficient. The Missouri Supreme
Court has said that "[a]ssurance of possibility is not of itself, however, suffi-
cient to make a submissible case, upon the issue of cause and effect, for a
plaintiff who has the burden of proof upon that issue." 22 This rule is pre-
mised on the belief that liability should not be based on guesswork, specu-
lation or conjecture and if the expert is unable to state that the alleged
negligence was a cause in fact of the injury, then the jury should not be
allowed to infer such causal connection. A corollary to this is
when evidence goes only to the extent of showing that a certain
condition might or could have been caused by one of two causes
for only one of which defendant is liable, such is not a substantial
showing of which of the causes produced the condition and fur-
nishes no basis from which a jury may reasonably find the cause.23
Therefore, if the expert states that the injury could, would, or might have
been caused by the negligence, the evidence is insufficient, since the expert
has only testified as to possibility. 24
16. Ketcham v. Thomas, 283 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); Jackson v. Cherokee
Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Smith v. Terminal Transfer Co.,
372 S.W.2d 659 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
17. James v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1966); Bertram v.
Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
18. James v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1966); Harrison v.
Weller, 423 S.W.2d 226 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
19. James v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1966); Walker v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 243 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1951). The requirement of reason-
able certainty most often arises with questions of medical testimony, but it applies
to all expert testimony on causation. See, e.g., Kinealy v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 368 S.W.2d 400 (Mo. 1963). This requirement also applies to questions of
permanent injuries. See, e.g., Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 243 S.W.2d 92
(Mo. 1951).
20. Ficken v. Hopkins, 389 S.W.2d 193, 202 (Mo. 1965), and cases cited therein.
21. Kiger v. Terminal P.R. Assoc. of St. Louis, 311 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1958);
Bertram v. Wunning, 385 S.W.2d 803 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). But see, Greer v.
Missouri State Highway Dept., 362 S.W.2d 773 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962), a workmen's
compensation case. Despite the similarity between causation questions in tort and
workmen's compensation cases, the latter require only reasonable probability to
sustain the commission's finding.
22. Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 334 Mo. 596, 600, 66 S.W.2d
561, 565 (1933); Lands v. Boyster, 417 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1967).
23. Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 243 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. 1951).
24. Ficken v. Hopkins, 389 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. 1965); Ketcham v. Thomas, 283
S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); DeMoulin v. Kissin, 446 S.W.2d 162 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969).
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Other than saying that absolute certainty is not required 25 and that
possibility is not sufficient, the courts have been satisfied to let further
definition of reasonable certainty be done on a case by case basis. The rule
itself is reasonable but the courts have tended to apply it strictly, and the
unfairness that can result has given rise to several exceptions. One is that
where "it may be determined from the testimony that the doctor was ex-
pressing his expert opinion as to the cause of a condition, the form of lan-
guage used will not deprive the statement of its evidentiary value."26 Thus,
in Smith v. St. Louis Public Service C0.27 the plaintiff's expert testimony as
in Bailey that he felt that the negligence caused the injury and used
such words as would, could, might and may, but the St. Louis Court of
Appeals upheld the verdict based on this exception. There are other cases
in accord with Smith where the court has not required the words "reason-
able medical certainty" to uphold the jury verdict.28 In some of these cases,
particularly Rogers v. Spain,2 9 the court seems to be paying lip service to
reasonable certainty, while actually requiring something less. Another ex-
ception, contrary to the previous one, is that a witness may qualify his
testimony in such a way as to render it of no probative value. Thus, this
exception is applicable when on cross-examination, the witness makes state-
ments inconsistent with his direct testimony.3 0
While not calling it an exception, the courts have held a case sub-
missible where only "possibility" was shown where there were "other facts"
which tended to support the conclusion that the result was caused by the
challenged act. 3 ' For example, in Ketcham v. Thomas3 2 all of plaintiffs
experts testified that an auto accident "could" cause increased menstrual
bleeding. The court said that the substantial evidence of the non-existence
of the condition before the accident and of its existence afterwards, along
with the "possibility" testimony, was sufficient.88 It is hard to reconcile
this case with the requirement of "reasonable medical certainty" because
in many cases there are "other facts" similar to those in Ketcham that would
support the inference of causation making possibility testimony sufficient.
Though this reasoning is arguably more fair, the courts have not seen fit
to apply it, as evidenced by the decision in Bailey.
25. Leavitt v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 340 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960),
and cases cited therein.
26. Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 362 Mo. 648, 652, 243 S.W.2d 92, 97
(1951), citing Smith v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 235 S.W.2d 102 (St. L. Mo. App.
1950). Accord, McDonald v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas KR., 401 S.W.2d 465 (Mo.
1966).
27. 235 S.W.2d 102 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
28. McDonald v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 401 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. 1966);
Rogers v. Spain, 388 S.W.2d 518 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Settel v. Horgan, 362
S.W.2d 769 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
29. 388 S.W.2d 518 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965), where the court interpreted state-
ments by the doctor as to probability and likelihood as a reasonable degree of
medical certainty.
30. Hoffman v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 274 S.W.2d 591 (St. L. Mo. App.
1955).
31. Bell v. S. S. Kresge Co., 129 S.W.2d 932 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
32. 283 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955).
35. Id. at 649-50.
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These above noted exceptions give the courts more discretion in ap-
plying the requirement of "reasonable medical certainty," thereby avoiding
unjust results. But the court in Bailey preferred to strictly apply the re-
quirement of "reasonable medical certainty." The court held that in this
case expert testimony of reasonable certainty was essential despite "other
facts" that in conjunction with the "possibility" testimony would have been
sufficient to make a submissible case. The "other facts" in Bailey were the
deceased's injuries, the necessity of and continual hospitalization, and the
decline of condition until the date of death. Secondly, the expert testified
that in his opinion the injuries received directly contributed to cause
death.3 4 The Springfield Court of Appeals disregarded this on the basis
of other testimony and, in considering the record "as a whole," even con-
sidered stricken testimony.3 5 Such an approach is contrary to the rule for
directing verdicts,3 6 which declares that the court must accept as true all
evidence favorable to plaintiff's right to recover, and must draw all reason-
able and favorable inferences therefrom.37 A stronger statement of the
rule is that "a verdict should be directed against a plaintiff only when the
facts in evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn from them are
so strongly against the plaintiff as to leave no grounds for reasonable minds
to differ."38 Viewed in this light the decision apparently rests on the ab-
sence from the witness' testimony of the magic words "reasonable medical
certainty," rather than the absence of facts or expert opinions from which
legitimate inferences of causation might have been drawn. In this respect,
the Bailey decision may be subject to some criticism.
The problem with the court's requirement of "reasonable medical
certainty" arises out of the nature of the witness and his profession. A med-
ical doctor is unfamiliar with the working of the legal system and his views
of "cause" are more exacting than the requirements of "legal cause."8 9
Apart from a natural reluctance to testify as to certainty,40 "[t]here is a
serious misunderstanding between the medical and legal professions, with
reference to the terminology used in accident cases in connection with the
subject of causation .... -41 Interestingly, the Springfield Court of Appeals
recognized this problem in Greer v. Missouri State Highway Department42
where the court said:
34. 444 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
35. Id. at 13.
36. Gaffner v. Alexander, 331 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1960), stating that the directed
verdict rule is applicable to proximate cause questions.
37. Gibson v. Newhouse, 402 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1966); Henry v. Baker, 419
S.W.2d 486 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
38. Mulliken v. Presley, 442 S.W.2d 153 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Schneider v.
Dannegger, 435 S.W.2d 413 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
39. Murray v. Industrial Comm., 349 P.2d 627 (Ariz. 1960); Averbach, Causa-
tion: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 CLrv.-Mj.. L. Rxv. 209 (1957); Small, Gaffing
at a Thing Called Cause; Medico-Legal Conflicts in The Concept of Causation, 31
Tax. L. RxEv. 625 (1953).
40. Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 Crmv.-MAut. L. REv.
209, 224 (1957).
41. Id. at 228.
42. 362 S.W.2d 773 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
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All we get from these treatises is that medicine is not an exact
science, that doctors do disagree, and that we should stick to our
own last [sic] and leave questions of medicine and medical theory
to the doctors .... 43
Requiring reasonable certainty of cause amplifies this misunderstanding
that medical cause is not necessarily legal cause, and predicating one upon
the other can only lead to unjust results. This becomes evident in areas
such as cancer where the medical cause is not known but a legal cause is
found.44
Though it is unlikely that this test requiring reasonable certainty will
be relaxed, the personal injury attorney can avoid most of the problems
in this area by proper preparation of witnesses.45 First of all he should
carefully explain the differences between legal and medical cause and he
should explain the legal theory of causation in his particular case. Sec-
ondly, if the witness is disinclined to testify that his opinion is based on
"reasonable medical certainty," he should be asked how he would testify
when asked whether his opinion is based on guesswork, speculation or con-
jecture. A negative answer to this question will satisfy the causation require-
ment. Another approach is to permit the witness to state other possible
causes and to eliminate them as possibilities. 46 This achieves reasonable
certainty by the process of elimination. Finally, if the treating physi-
cian will only testify as to possibility of causation, the attorney should still
use such testimony, but in conjunction with the testimony of a non-treating
expert medical witness. If this one expert can testify with "reasonable med-
ical certainty" on causation in response to a proper hypothetical question,
a submissible case is made. Naturally, the attorney should attempt to find
an expert who is particularly familiar with this legal-medical problem of
causation. If the attorney is properly prepared the stumbling block of "rea-
sonable medical certainty" will seldom keep a case from the jury.47
JoHN S. SANDBERG
43. Id. at 780.
44. Murray v. Industrial Comm., 349 P.2d 627 (Ariz. 1960); Daly v. Berg-
stadt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964); Golob v. Buckingham Motel, 244
Minn. 301, 69 N.W.2d 636 (1955); Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc., 234 Minn.
517, 48 N.W.2d 735 (1951) ; Hanna v. Aetna Ins. Co., 259 N.E.2d 177 (Dayton, Ohio
Mun. Ct. 1970).
45. Dorsey v. Muilenburg, 345 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. 1961), where the facts were
similar to those in Bailey but the result was different.
46. Id.
47. For further help in this area see Dooley, How to Try a Personal Injury
Case, 15 Crxv.-MAR. L. Rav. 433, 446-451 (1966).
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CAUSATION-ATTORNEYS' FEES AND SECTION 14 (a)
OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite1
Petitioners, shareholders of Electric Auto-Lite Company, filed suit
against that company seeking to enjoin management from voting proxies
obtained through the use of an allegedly misleading proxy solicitation.
The vote, concerning a proposed merger between Auto-Lite and Mergen-
thaler Linotype Company, was taken the following day and the merger was
consummated. An amended complaint was filed by petitioners alleging
violations of section 14 (a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19342 and
SEC Rule 14a-93 in that "the proxy statement failed to reveal, in soliciting
a two-thirds stockholders' vote for the merger, that the directors of both
Mergenthaler and Auto-Lite were controlled by a third company, American
Manufacturing Company,"4 The district court, granting summary judg-
ment, ruled that as a matter of law the omission was material and concluded
that the necessary causal link between the deceptive proxy solicitation and
merger was present where some of the minority shareholders' proxy votes
were essential to approve the merger.5 Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in J. L Case Company v. Borak6 the court concluded that the
"lower Federal Courts have been given the mandate to further develop a
Federal Common Law of Corporations"7 and that the question of causal
relationship was one question that should be resolved at the trial level.
The case was then referred to a master to consider what relief was appro-
priate. The district court made the certification required by 28 U. S. C.
Section 1292 (b), and defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1964). This section reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national
securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
to any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to
section 78 (1) of this title.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (a) (1964).
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting of other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or mis-
leading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communica-
tion with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
4. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826, 827 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
5. Id. at 831.
6. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
7. 281 F. Supp. at 829.
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The court of appeals held that the proxy statement was as a matter of
law materially deficient and in violation of section 14 (a), but reversed on
the issue of causation on the theory that plaintiffs, as a prerequisite to
establishing liability, had to show that the misleading statement and omis-
sion caused the submission of sufficient proxies to affect the outcome of the
vote.8 The court held that if "by a preponderance of probabilities the mer-
ger would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy statement had
not been misleading.... ."9 the defendants would be entitled to a decision
in their favor. The court held that since showing reliance by thousands of
individuals is impractical, if defendants could establish that the merger
was fair to the minority shareholders, this would support a conclusion that
enough shareholders would have voted for the merger notwithstanding
the deceptive proxy statement; therefore, there should be no liability on
the part of defendants.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reinstated the decision of
the district court, holding that there was a violation of section 14 (a) and
rule 14a-9 as a matter of law because the proxy statement was materially
misleading. The Court held that under Borak causation was adequately
shown where it is proven that the proxy statement was materially mislead-
ing and the solicitation was an essential link to the consummation of the
merger.10 The Court indicated that the essential link is present where
some of the minority shareholders' votes are necessary. Refusing to allow
the issue of liability to be foreclosed, as the appellate court had permitted
by a judicial determination of fairness, the Court said such "[a] judicial
appraisal to the merger's merits could be substituted for the actual and in-
formed vote of the stockholders."" The remedy which is to be determined
in the first instance by the district court was not expressly set out. Two
possible kinds of relief were enumerated. First, the merger could be set
aside, or second, monetary relief could be given but "damages would be
,recoverable only to the extent that they can be shown."' 2 The Court read
section 27(b) of the 1934 Act' s which makes contracts made in vio-
lation of the act "void" to mean that such contracts were "voidable" at the
instance of the injured party. Therefore the act does not require the court
to "unscramble a corporate transaction merely because a violation oc-
curred."14 Considering the issue of attorneys' fees, the Court agreed with
the argument that "petitioners, who have established a violation of the
8. Mills v. Elec. Autolite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968).
9. Id. at 436.
10. 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
11. Id. at 381.
12. Id. at 389.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (b) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of
any rule or regulation thereunder ... shall be void (1) as regards the rights
of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation,
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, and
(2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such con-
tract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of
the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract
was in violation of any such provision, rule or regulation....
14. 396 U.S. at 386.
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securities laws by the corporation and its officials, should be reimbursed
by the corporation or its survivor for the costs of establishing the viola-
tion."' 5 This conclusion was reached although there was as of yet no defi-
nite remedy or common fund recovered by the plaintiff's effort. The Court
held that the express provision for attorneys' fees in section 9 (c)16 and sec-
tion 18 (a)17 of the 1934 Act "should not be read as denying to the courts the
power to award counsel fees in suits under other sections of the Act .... 1
J. I. Case v. Borak19 held, in sweeping language, that there is an im-
plied civil action to redress a corporation and its officers for violations of
section 14 (a). "The purpose of section 14 (a) is to prevent management or
others from obtaining authorization for corporate actions by... deceptive
or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation." 20 The Borak language
implied that some element of causation was essential to the cause of action
but was vague and unclear as to the nature of the causal element. Causa-
tion has been the subject of various decisions in lower federal courts, and
prior to the Mills decision much confusion and conflict was present. For
example, in Barnett v. Anaconda,21 the requirement of causation was con-
strued narrowly and relief was denied. In that case the plaintiff, a minority
stockholder in Anaconda Wire and Cable Company, brought suit against
defendant Anaconda Company, the majority stockholder of Anaconda Wire
and Cable Company, for violation of section 14 (a). The plaintiff alleged
that he sustained damages due to the dissolution of Anaconda Wire and
Cable Company and the exchange of its stock for that of defendant Ana-
conda Company. Anaconda owned 73% of the stock of the dissolved com-
pany which thereby assured the success of any proposed sale and dissolution
vote. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the complaint saying, "In the case at bar the necessary
causal connection between the alleged violation of section 14 (a) and the
alleged injury to the minority stockholders is wholly-lacking." 22 The court
reasoned that since the defendant owned enough shares to assure passage
of any proposal voted on at a stockholders' meeting there was no possibility
that the misleading proxies could have in any way affected the vote or in-
jured the plaintiffs.23
15. Id. at 389-390.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) provides:
Any person who willfully participates in any act ... in violation ... of
this section, shall be liable... for the payment of the costs of such suit,
and . . . reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees, against either party
litigant ....
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964) provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement ... [in
certain documents filed with the SEC] which [is] false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, shall be liable ... for the payment of
the costs of such suit... including reasonable attorneys' fees....
18. 396 U.S. at 390-91.
19. 877 U.S. 426 (1964).
20. Id. at 431.
21. 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
22. Id. at 773.
23. Id. at 773-74. See Note, 51 IowA L. Rav. 515 (1966). See also Richland v.
Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). There the court took a strict "but for"
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Laurenzano v. Einbender,2 4 decided by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, involved facts similar to the Barnett
case. Defendants controlled 65% of the voting stock of the corporation,
thus insuring that any vote taken at a stockholders' meeting would be de-
cided by them. Plaintiff, a minority stockholder, brought suit based on
section 14 (a) alleging that false and misleading proxy statements had been
issued pursuant to the stockholders' meeting. Defendant objected to juris-
diction, claiming the proxy statements were needless and were not the legal
cause of the complained injuries. The court in overruling defendant's
motion to dismiss said, "The meeting does not become nugatory and dis-
pensable because one stockholder owns enough shares to carry any resolu-
tion .... " 25 The court went on to state, "The meeting must be held; the
stockholders must receive a truthful proxy statement... [and] if proxies
are solicited, the stockholders have a statutory right to a truthful proxy
statement."2 6 Thus, the court felt that causation as a matter of law was
proven by establishing that there was a material omission in the proxy
statement.
In the Mills case the defendant owned 54% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation and therefore could not have assured authorization of
the merger without a substantial number of minority stockholders voting
in favor of the merger.2 ' The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Harlan, concluded that the causal relationship had been established as a
matter of law where "a shareholder... proves that the proxy solicitation
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was
an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction." 28 This de-
cision, however, does not resolve the conflict between the district courts
where management controls enough votes to approve the transaction with-
out any minority votes.29 While the court recognized the Laurenzano case,
they expressly refrained from either approving or disapproving that de-
cision.80 Perhaps the court wishes to imply that even where the proxy
statement is materially misleading there still must be some proxy votes
necessary for the approval of the action being taken. Conversely, if none of
the proxy votes are necessary then the causal element would be missing
and the court would reach a result opposite the Laurenzano decision. Strong
argument, however, can be espoused in favor of a holding consistent with
Laurenzano. As stated in Mills, "Use of a solicitation which is materially
misleading is of itself a violation of the law ... [and] injunctive relief...
[will] be available to remedy such a defect if sought prior to the stock-
stance and decided as a matter of law that misleading proxy material cannot be
held responsible for the outcome of a vote when the solicitors have self sufficient
voting power to achieve the desired result.
24. 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
25. Id. at 862.
26. Id:
27. Thirteen percent of the minority shareholders were required to vote in
favor of the proposal for the merger to be authorized, since two-thirds was the
statutory requirement.
28. 396 U.S. at 385 (1970).




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol36/iss1/9
RECENT CASES
holders' meeting."31 Therefore, there seems to be no rational reason why
subsequent relief should not also be available to a minority stockholder
who has been injured. Since the Mills court does not say what their result
would be in the Laurenzano situation, their decision can go either way in
a later case.
The second issue which the court decided involved the award of in-
terim costs and attorneys' fees. Private enforcement of the Securities Act,
especially section 14 (a) and section 10 (b),3 2 is extremely important as a
deterrent to unlawful action by corporate management. Although no ex-
press statutory basis can be found for awarding interim expenses and
attorneys' fees3 3 the Court agreed with the United States as amicus curiae
"that petitioners, who have established a violation of the securities laws by
their corporation and its officials, should be reimbursed by the corporation
or its survivor for the costs of establishing the violation."3 4
The rule has long been established that a trustee or person acting as
trustee will be reimbursed for successful litigation where a common interest
among the security holders is involved. The leading case applying that
principle is Trustees v. Greenough35 decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1881. Today counsel fees are usually awarded where the
shareholder's suit results in pecuniary benefit to the corporation or the
shareholders3 6 in the form of a common fund. In the instant case no com-
mon fund has been produced for the benefit of the group as a result of
petitioner's efforts. The Court said, however, "The fact that this suit has
not yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary recovery from
which the fees could be paid does not preclude an award based on this ra-
tionale."3 7
Agreeing with a decision of the Second Circuit38s involving section
16 (b) of the 1934 Act 39 the Court concluded that section 9 (e) and section
18 (a) which specifically allow for attorneys' fees should not be read as deny-
51. Id. at 383.
32. As Amended, 15 U.S.C. 78j (b) (1964).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any
facility of any national securities exchange . .. (b) to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a na-
tional securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commissioner may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
3. The remedies available to persons injured by violations of either § 10 (b)
or § 14 (a) are the same in that both sections can serve as a basis for rescission,
damages, or equitable relief in the nature of an injunction. However, § 28 limits
recovery under the Act to actual damages. See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRiTiEs REGULATION
1792 (2d ed. 1961).
34. 396 U.S. at 389-390. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's De-
rivative Suits, 39 COLTJM. L. Rrv. 784 (1939).
35. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
36. See H. BALLATINE, Corporations § 156 (rev. ed. 1946).
37. 396 U.S. at 392.
38. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (p) This section involves the recovery of short swing profits
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ing the courts the power to award attorneys' fees under other sections of the
act ".... when circumstances make such an award appropriate .... ,41 The
Court in order to do equity implies an award of attorneys' fees and creates
an exception to the general American rule that costs do not include attorneys
fees. Other court created exceptions to the general rule involve class actions
and derivative actions where expenses incurred by one shareholder are
spread among all shareholders by requiring the corporation to pay the
successful plaintiffs attorneys' fees. Public policy and the importance that
Congress has placed on corporate suffrage require that the plaintiff who
establishes a cause of action be awarded attorneys' fees.
The third issue which the Mills Court considers but does not decide
is the remedy to which plaintiff is entitled. Section 29 (b) of the Securities
Act 41 makes every contract made in violation of the Act void with respect
to the rights of the violator. But even though the violator could not enforce
the contract, section 29 (b) does not necessarily require that the merger must
be set aside. The relief to be granted "must hinge on whether setting aside
the merger would be in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole. ' 42
Petitioners in this case did not vote their shares in favor of the merger 43 and
therefore are not parties to the agreement and do not enjoy a statutory right
to rescind. Indicating that the decision as to the proper remedy is in the first
instance to be made by the district court, the Court in dicta enumerates only
two possible forms of relief. First the merger could be set aside. However,
fairness of the terms of the merger, the best interest of other shareholders
and the fact that there is no express statutory policy which requires the un-
scrambling of the corporate transaction are factors to be considered. The
second possible form of relief the Court mentions is money damages. The
damages recoverable would only be that amount that can be shown. If direct
injury is impossible to establish, relief would again have to be based on the
"fairness of the terms of the merger at the time it was approved." 44 The
Court sets no real guidelines for the district court to follow other than the
relief must be fair and equitable.
The courts, under the guise of enforcing the legislative intent of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1984, have created a whole new area of court
made law. First, they found an implied private right of action in individual
shareholders for violation of the Act.45 This case indicates that they have
created another court made remedy by allowing recovery of attorneys' fees.
Mr. Justice Black dissenting in the Mills case with respect to the allowance
of attorneys' fees has this to say: "The courts are interpreters, not creators,
of legal rights to recovery and if there is a need for recovery of attorneys'
fees to effectuate the policies of the Act here involved, that need should in
my judgment be met by Congress, not by this Court."46 The allowance of
attorneys' fees will make the bringing of suits more attractive. However,
40. 396 U.S. at 391.
41. 15 U.S.C. §78cc(b) (1964).
42. 396 U.S. at 388.
43. 396 U.S. at 388 n.11.
44. 396 U.S. at 389.
45. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
46. 396 U.S. at 397.
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until some guidelines are laid down regarding the relief which a successful
stockholder can expect to receive, it is unlikely that large numbers of stock-
holders will risk their time and money prosecuting a violation of the proxy
rules.
DARYL N. SNADON
A NEW GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA OF GUILTY:
PLEA INVOLUNTARILY INDUCED BY
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
State v. Rose'
Rose was charged with stealing tires and, represented by counsel of his
own choice, pleaded not guilty. Six months later, represented by the same
attorney, Rose changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to two years
imprisonment without parole. After his commitment to custody, he filed
a pro se motion under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.262 to set aside the
conviction on the grounds that the plea of guilty was involuntary. At the
hearing on the motion, Rose, represented by appointed counsel, testified
that his original attorney had repeatedly urged him to change his plea to
guilty because he had talked to the judge, the prosecutor, and the parole of-
ficer and had made arrangements for probation. Rose was the only witness
at the hearing.
On the basis of the record made at the time of the pleas the trial
court found that the plea of guilty had been entered voluntarily. The court
also found:
that nopromise had been made to defendant nor could defendant
have reasonable believed he would receive any special consideration
for parole for entering a plea of guilty to the charge. Certainly
there was no evidence of the State making any promise to defend-
ant. We have only the defendant's statement that his counsel made
a promise which, if true, could not benefit this defendant at this
hearing.4
The court accordingly denied the motion on the ground that the defend-
ant had failed to establish that the plea was involuntary.
On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court appellant challenged the
trial court's conclusion of law that promises by appellant's counsel, as dis-
tinguished from promises by the state, "could not benefit this defendant
at this hearing."5 Since no prior Missouri case had dealt with this precise
1. 440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969).
2. Mo. R. Ca.m. P. 27.26.
3. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), requiring a record.
4. 440 S.W.2d 441, 442-43 (Mo. 1969).
5. Id. at 443.
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question, the court reviewed cases from several other jurisdictions, and
found a split of authority. 6 The court felt, however, that because "a defend-
ant is particularly susceptible to misleading by his own attorney", 7 the
reasoning of the line of cases which permits a defendant to set aside a judg-
ment and guilty plea induced by misrepresentations of his attorney was the
sounder. Accordingly the case was remanded to the trial court for an explicit
finding on the factual issues raised by the motion and the evidence.
According to some statistics approximately 90 to 95 percent of all per-
sons charged with crimes enter pleas of guilty.8 Many of these pleas are
the result of either plea bargaining9 with the prosecutor, or are based on
the recommendation of counsel to avoid a jury trial in the hope that the
judge will give a more lenient sentence. When the expectations of leniency
or parole thus created fail to materialize, it is obvious that a great number
of defendants will move to withdraw their guilty pleas.10 As a result of these
motions, there have been several developments at both the state and federal
levels which establish standards and procedures to be followed by the trial
court in accepting the plea of guilty. The remainder of this note will be
concerned with a discussion of these, and the effect that Rose will have on
the law as it presently stands.
While there is little disagreement that one who pleads guilty involun-
tarily should not be bound by that plea, there is a great deal of difficulty
in determining what constitutes such an involuntary plea. It is obvious, of
course, that "involuntariness" can result from either physical or mental co-
ercion; that is, a plea may be just as involuntary if it is the result of false
promises of parole as it is if it results from physical abuse." It is very diffi-
cult to determine, however, when the mental coercion rises to such a level
6. The court cited the following cases rejecting the proposition that the de-
fendant can obtain past conviction relief by proving misrepresentations by counsel:
People v. Stillwell, 162 Cal. App. 2d 175, 328 P.2d 21 (1958); People v. Gilbert, 25
Cal.2d 422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944); People v. Martinez, 88 Cal. App. 2d 767, 199
P.2d 375 (1948) ; Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 19683); People v.
King, 284 App. Div. 1015, 135 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1954); People v. Bofill, 19 Misc. 2d
708, 192 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1959); People v. Brim, 22 Misc. 2d 35, 199 N.Y.S.2d 744
K1960); Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 437 P.2d 620 (1968). The Missouri Supreme
court noted that:
These cases appear to be based upon the theory that the attorney is the
agent of the accused and that the defendant cannot avail himself of even
willfully false statements of factual matters by his own attorney. 440 S.W.2d
441, 444 (Mo. 1969)
For cases accepting the proposition, the court cited Long v. State, 231 Ind. 59, 106
N.E.2d 692 (1952) and United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp.
508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (containing an exhaustive study of rules in the area).
7. State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Mo. 1969).
8. See Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
9. See the discussion of plea bargaining in Note, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865
1964). See also State v. Tyler, 440 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Mo. En Banc 1969), in which
e court cited with approval the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS oF GUILTY § 3.3
(Approved Draft, 1968).
10. R. Cipes, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 11.05 in 8 Mooir's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE (1969).
11. State v. Cochran, 332 Mo. 742, 60 S.W.2d 1 (1933).
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that the guilty plea results from such coercion. This is a problem that the
courts have attempted to solve for many years.
Thus, even though most of the developments have taken place rela-
tively recently, it is interesting to note that as early as 1880 the Missouri
Supreme Court recognized that the law should not be full of traps to catch
the unwary defendant who has pleaded guilty involuntarily.12 Since this
time, the cases have been concerned primarily with developing criteria to
determine the voluntariness of a plea. Thus, in the 1920 case of State v.
Dale,13 the court stated:
It is immaterial whether the misleading was intentionally or un-
intentionally done. The material inquiry is: Was the defendant mis-
led, or under a misapprehension at the time he entered his plea,
of guilty?14
It is interesting to note that even at this time the court was more concerned
with the actual, subjective state of mind of the defendant than with the
source of the misapprehension. Thirteen years later, the court expanded on
the test set out in the Dale case and stated:
If the defendant should be misled or be induced to plead guilty
by fraud or mistake, by misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the
holding out of hopes which prove to be false or ill founded, he
should be permitted to withdraw his plea. The law favors a trial
on the merits.' 5
Combining these two statements, it becomes apparent that to justify the
withdrawal of a guilty plea there must be a holding out of false hopes
which subjectively misleads the defendant. Therefore, it is not sufficient
for a defendant to show that statements holding out false hope were made
unless he also shows that there was, in fact, a misapprehension created. The
question that this raises is how the court is to determine whether the de-
fendant was suffering from such misapprehension.
Since the determination is one of the defendant's subjective state of
mind, some external proof is obviously needed. Normally, of course, the
only such evidence available will be the defendant's own statements. Thus,
it is not surprising that the courts have required the trial judge to examine
the defendant, and assure himself that the guilty plea is voluntarily and
intelligently made.16 This is particularly true in a case where the defendant
12. State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535 (1880).
13. 282 Mo. 663, 222 S.W. 763 (1920).
14. State v. Dale, 282 Mo. 663, 669, 222 S.W. 763, 764 (1920).
15. State v. Cochran, 332 Mo. 742, 745, 60 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1933).
16. Mo. R. Cnu. P. 25.04. See R. Cipes, Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, in
8 Mooae's FEDERAL PRAcncE (1969). Cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 91 S.Ct. 160(1970) where the Supreme Court held that a plea of guilty containing a protestation
of innocence was not rendered involuntary where made to avoid the possibility of
the death penalty.
Interestingly enough, Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.04 might require a contrary result:
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is unrepresented by counsel. In such cases, the United States Supreme Court
has stated:
The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his
right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not auto-
matically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver
must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges,
the statutory offenses included within them, the range of the al-
lowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges
and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essen-
tial to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can
make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is under-
standingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and compre-
hensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a
plea is tendered.17
However, while the unrepresented defendant receives a great deal of
protection by the courts, this is not to say that the trial court can assume
that a defendant represented by counsel has voluntarily entered his guilty
plea.18 Thus, Rule 25.04 of the Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure' 9
and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure20 require the
trial court to determine that the guilty plea is made "voluntarily with un-
derstanding of the nature of the charge" before accepting it. This, of course,
implies some affirmative action on the part of the trial court in order to
ascertain such understanding, and the cases have so held.2' In the recent
case of State v. Roach,22 the Missouri Supreme Court explained the require-
ments of 25.04 in the following manner.
Before accepting a plea of guilty it is the duty of the trial court to
ascertain that accused understands the consequences of his plea of
guilty, and to satisfy himself that the accused has not been induced
to enter the plea on the basis of false hope or ill-founded expec-
tation of lemence. Among other things, it must be made clear tothe accused that the court is not bound to accept the recommenda-
tions, of the prosecuting attorney with reference to the amount. of.
punIshment or the matter of probation or parole; that it is withinthe power the he court to ignore all recommendations and imposewhatever lawful punishment the court may deem appropriate,
and to grant or withhold lenience, probation or parole as the court
in its sole judgment may determine with or without regard to anysuggestions, recommendations, promises or prior understand-
ing.... This requires an affirmative demonstration on the rec-ord.... The transcript of the proceedings in the trial court at thetie the plea of guilty is accepted should demonstrate a substan-tial compliance with the reqirements of Rule t m5.04.
17. Von Moltke v. Gillies 82 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
18. State v. Blaylock, 894 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1965).19. Mo. t Cm!. P. 25.04.20. See R. Cipes, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 11, in 8 MOOe'S Frt.
PnAcrncE (1969).21. State v. Mountjoy, 420 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. 1967).
22. 447 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1969).23. Id. at 556 (citations omitted).
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Interestingly enough, just a few months after this Missouri decision, the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of Boykin v. Alabama24 in
which the Court found that a plea of guilty in a state court involves a
waiver of several federal constitutional rights: the privilege against com-
pulsory self incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to con-
front one's accusers. Accordingly, it was stated, "We cannot presume a waiver
of these three important federal rights from a silent record.' 25 The Court
held that it was reversible error for the trial court to accept petitioner's
guilty plea without an affirmative showing reflected by the record, that it
was intelligent and voluntary. The result, of course, is that the "affirma-
tive showing" required by the Roach case is now required as a matter of
federal due process of law, and the question of effective waiver of these
federal constitutional rights is governed by federal standards.
But despite the pronouncements of the Missouri and federal courts
regarding standards and procedures, prior to Rose there was a void in Mis-
souri law as to what effect, if any, the source of the misapprehension would
have. That is, assuming the defendant was under a misapprehension that he
would receive parole after pleading guilty, would he be denied the right to
withdraw the plea if the source of the misapprehension were someone other
than the state? Rose answered this question in the negative, at least in the
situation where defense counsel misleads his client. However, the decision
raises another question of far reaching importance. Has the Missouri court,
by holding that the plea may be withdrawn if the defendant's attorney is the
sole source of misapprehension, gone beyond the federal requirements of
due process by not requiring any "state action" against the defendant's in-
terest's in this situation?
Basically, Rose seems to stand for the proposition that state action is
not required to be the source of a defendant's misapprehension. The court
says that "The original statement (findings of the trial court) that no
promises were made is limited by the further finding that the state made no
promise." 26 Furthermore, an examination of the cases cited by the court in
support of its position shows that they were not concerned with any state
action limitation; instead the courts were concerned with the injustice of
holding a defendant to a guilty plea induced by a mistaken belief. Based
upon these facts it could be concluded that the court did in fact dispense
with any state action requirement in this situation, thereby going beyond
federal due process requirements to do justice.
Nevertheless, there is a very plausible argument that the state action
theory was not dispensed with by Rose. Since the subjective federal stand-
ard for waiver of constitutional rights requires "an intentional relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," 27 state courts are re-
quired to take affirmative action to insure that the defendant's plea of
guilty involves an intentional waiver of federal constitutional rights.28 Ac-
24. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
25. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
26. State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Mo. 1969).
27. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
28. Several United States Supreme Court decisions strongly suggest a subjec-
tive federal standard of voluntariness of guilty pleas which applies to the states
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cordingly, if a defendant pleads guilty while under a misapprehension, the
court's failure to uncover the involuntary nature of the plea, regardless of
the source of the misapprehension, arguably would constitute the requisite
state action against the defendant's rights. 2 9 Therefore, the Rose decision
may be based on the dictates of due process of law.
MAuv TOFrE
through the due process clause. The Supreme Court has incorporated the principles
of Johnson v. Zerbst into the area of guilty pleas. In Johnson the Court stated
that there must be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Furthermore, in Boykin v. Alabama
the Court observed,
Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or bla-
tant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. The ques-
tion of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceed-
ing is of course governed by federal standards. 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
The Supreme Court has also said, about Johnson, in a federal case involving Fau.
R. CRnt. P. 11,
Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and
knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore
void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements
of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the de-
fendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969). In his dissent in Boykin, Justice
Harlan concludes that the decision binds the states to the rigid requirements of
F D. R. Ci m. P. 11. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969). If this approach
is followed by the Supreme Court, state court judges will need to make a very ex-
tensive inquiry into the question of the voluntariness of a guilty plea, see McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (judge should have questioned defendant
on intent-factual basis for plea).
29. The whole guilty plea process may also be regarded as a creation of the
state, and any flaws in the process, including denial of effective assistance of coun-
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